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ABSTRACT 
 
This article departs from the observation of accentuated degradation of ecosystems 
worldwide to stress the urgency in changing the patterns of occupation of the land, 
production, consumption and the ecological and ethical goals of environmental conservation. 
Aiming to achieve these ends, this article proposes the acknowledgement of the principle of 
resilience in international environmental law. The principle of resilience is articulated herein 
based on the concept of ecological resilience; the values of land ethic; and the existing 
principles of international environmental law. Later, the article explains how the principle can 
be applied to adaptive governance; adaptive management; environmental impact assessment; 
land use legislation; and market incentives for conservation. The article concludes that the 
principle of resilience is aimed at providing moral and ecological foundation for sustainable 
development and a green economy; to require judges, administrators and operators of law to 
consider the long-term consequences of their actions on nature and on future generations, 
thereby achieving better conservation patterns on a case by case basis; to enlighten legislators 
on how domestic environmental legislation can be improved; to impose an individual and 
societal moral obligation to respect and improve nature, and to live in harmony with it. 
Finally, the article proposes a legal framework for implementation of the principle in 
domestic and international environmental law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Scientific findings have often concluded that environmental quality levels are getting 
worse despite efforts towards environmental protection. Such findings demonstrate the need 
for a change in strategy towards conservation. However, changing the way humans act 
towards conservation is not an easy task because (1) environmental protection deals with very 
complex structures, the ecosystems; (2) conservation cannot be addressed solely by one field 
of knowledge, it requires an interdisciplinary approach; (3) and because it will not be 
achieved through the efforts of only one sector of society, solely government, market, or 
individual citizens – it requires a conjugation of efforts among all sectors.  
Since humankind started to get concerned about the degradation of nature, we focused 
our attention on the preservation of specific species of fauna and flora that, for whatever 
reason, inspired our attraction. Environmental laws also focused on the preservation of 
landscapes that distinguished themselves by their exceptional beauty, by their importance or 
because they were the remains of an almost extinct ecosystem or the habitat of some almost 
extinct species1. By those means, humankind thought that, by preserving at least samples of 
each ecosystem and its inhabitant species, they were conserving biodiversity. However, those 
samples continued to suffer degradation, despite the efforts to guarantee stability and to keep 
their original state. By studying the causes of this phenomenon, ecologists concluded that 
ecosystems preserved in only a few restricted areas were collapsing because they were too 
vulnerable to disturbances. They noticed that this increase in vulnerability has been occurring 
since human occupation of land around the world increased in extension and intensity, as a 
result of the expansion of industrialization. 
But why did ecosystems get more vulnerable? Because, by eradicating species, by 
polluting the environment and by changing environmental features, humankind has reduced 
ecosystem resilience2. The increased vulnerability of ecosystems cause them to suffer 
unpredictable changes. These changes are generally also undesirable for humankind because 
                                                           
 
1
 In the United States, the preservation of specific ecosystems due to the presence of almost extinct species 
started in 1972, when the Endangered Species Act was enacted. 
2
 Carl Folke et al, Regime Shifts, Resilience, and Biodiversity in Ecosystem Management, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE 119, 142 (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 2009).  
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all production of services and goods, and all the features of land use rely on the predictability 
of basic natural characteristics such as the frequency and intensity of rains, or the geological 
solidity of mountains over which cities are built, or the chemical composition of the soil. 
What increases the danger of loss of ecosystem resilience for humans and for the other 
creatures that inhabit these ecosystems is that, depending on the intensity of the alteration of 
an ecosystem, the change may turn out to be irreversible.  
The concern about resilience is related to the questions “how do we deal with 
sustainability?” and “how do we address climate change?”. The concept of ecosystem 
resilience may be a new opportunity to achieve sustainability – which has been pursued 
without great success since 1987, when the World Commission on Environment and 
Development (also known as the Brundland Commission) popularized the term and the 
definition of “sustainable development”3. 
The concept of ecosystem resilience also affects how we address climate change 
because, after all, if ecosystems are currently vulnerable, how are they going to resist 
disturbances such as climate change and the rise in sea level? In the face of the growing 
expectation and certainty that ecosystems will be seriously damaged4 and that human inaction 
will only exacerbate the negative impacts of this event, humankind has begun considering 
what should be done to restore ecosystem resilience and to avoid consequences of even 
greater proportions. 
 Scientists concluded that, in order to restore ecosystem resilience, it is not enough to 
preserve the ecosystem in limited tracts of land - it is necessary to preserve the ecosystem 
functions, that is, the few natural mechanisms that continuously occur within an ecosystem 
and that are responsible for maintaining the subsistence of its inhabitant species and the 
function of the ecosystem as a whole.  
 The natural mechanisms on which an ecosystem relies are provided by the diversity of 
species5; thus the enhancement of ecosystem resilience requires the conservation of 
                                                           
 
3
 U.N. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future, U.N. Doc. A/42/427(Aug. 
4,1987). 
4
 See STEFFEN, W., ET AL, GLOBAL CHANGE AND THE EARTH SYSTEM: A PLANET UNDER PRESSURE (2004) 
5
 Carl Folke et al., Biological Diversity, Ecosystems, and the Human Scale, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL 
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 151, 154-158. 
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biodiversity. In fact, this finding does not bring new challenges for the regulation of human 
activities or for the relationship between humans and nature. In some way or another, humans 
have always sought to maintain biodiversity because the extinction of species is condemned 
both by a moral approach – which posits that we should protect species from extinction 
because we can do it and it is the right thing to do – and by the utilitarian approach, which 
stresses that the extinction of a species can cause disturbances in ecosystems, therefore 
harming humans, or can deprive humans of valuable services, such as the cure for mortal 
diseases that were hidden in some gene of the extinct species6.  
 In order to conserve ecosystem resilience, however, ecologists recognize that it is not 
sufficient to preserve samples of each species and ecosystem in limited protected areas, 
presumably to preserve biodiversity: ecosystems should be preserved everywhere7. That 
finding creates a huge impact in the relationship between humans and nature because humans 
are already reluctant to enforce conservation of nature in a few places, even more so to 
recognize conservation of nature everywhere. 
 Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that the reform of conservation institutions to make 
them more adaptable to the changing needs of ecosystems’ management could contribute to 
the achievement of the objective of preserving nature everywhere8.   
As for institutional reform, adaptive governance coupled with adaptive management is 
regarded as a strong tool to enhance the achievement of resilience when managing an 
ecosystem. Adaptive governance enhances an institution’s capability to deal flexibly with new 
situations, thus preparing managers for uncertainty and surprise9. Adaptive management is the 
process of learning from experience by monitoring ecosystem responses to actions taken by 
institutions that manage ecosystems10. 
Although adaptive governance and adaptive management can be useful tools to 
address resilience, they are not sufficient. The achievement of resilience requires a substantial 
                                                           
 
6
 ZYGMUNT J. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 432-434 (4th ed., 2010). 
7
 Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160; ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 190-194 (Ballantine Books 
1970) (1949).  
8
 Folke, supra note 5, at 160. 
9 Carl Folke et al., Adaptive Governance of Social-Ecological Systems, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T RESOURCES 441, 447 
(2005). 
10
 Barbara Cosens, Transboundary River Governance in the Face of Uncertainty, v. 30 n. 5 J. LAND RESOURCES 
& ENVTL. L. 229, 238. 
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change in the way humankind relates to nature because humans are not used to compromise 
their activities according to the capacity of the ecosystem to support them. Humankind is used 
to dominate, not to coexist with, nature. The inversion of this setting cannot possibly be 
achieved by a simple change in management methodology: it requires a change of values. 
According to Aldo Leopold, nature conservation should start first by understanding 
nature and by setting the values we want conservation to have11. As the law is the tool used to 
express, systematize and implement the values of organized societies, we believe that law has 
a role to play in associating the concept of ecological resilience with values humankind 
should adopt when developing activities that impact nature.  
This discussion has exceptional importance now, at the imminence of the United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, to be held in Rio de Janeiro in 2012. IUCN 
President Ashok Khosla mentioned that “Rio+20 needs to review 40 years of unfulfilled 
commitments and explore genuine alternatives to current practices”12. The principle of 
resilience developed here is envisioned by this article as one of these alternatives. 
The discussion on how the law can enforce new values of conservation is expected to 
go beyond 2012, in order to influence domestic law-making and decision-making in public 
and private institutions alike. 
This work seeks to develop the role law could play in contributing to the achievement 
of ecosystem resilience. Therefore, adopting Aldo Leopold’s view of conservation, by which 
the first step should be to understand nature, this article will begin with a brief explanation of 
the ecological background to the concept of ecosystem resilience. Next, the article will 
consider Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic in order to discuss the values we should look for when 
implementing conservation for resilience. Regarding those values and concepts, the following 
part of the article will be dedicated to consolidating and contextualizing the legal principle. 
In order to carry out a more detailed analysis about how the principle of resilience can 
be pursued in the application of the law, this work will focus on certain sectors of 
environmental law and policy making. Those sectors are: adaptive governance; adaptive 
                                                           
 
11
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 210. 
12
 IISD, Summary Of The Nineteenth Session Of The Commission On Sustainable Development, v.5 n.304  
EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULLETIN 16 May 2011, available at http://www.iisd.ca/vol05/enb05304e.html (last 
viewed Nov. 16, 2011). 
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management; environmental impact assessment; land use and climate change adaptation; and 
market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services. The article will be based on cases 
from different parts of the world. As the adoption of the concept of resilience by law seems to 
be incipient in the jurisdictions of most countries, we believe that such case studies will be 
helpful to any jurisdiction in the world where this concept is still not effective. 
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ECOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE 
 
Resilience is the capacity of a system to absorb disturbance, to reorganize itself and 
persist. A system is resilient when, even under impacts, it is able to retain essentially the same 
initial conditions, tending towards a state of equilibrium. This stable state of a system is called 
the “basin of attraction,”13 “domain of attraction” or “stability domain”14.  
Ecological systems have more than one stable state or basin of attraction15. The group 
of basins of attraction related to the same ecosystem is called the “stability landscape”16. 
When the ecosystem is already vulnerable to disruptions, and therefore less resilient, and 
those disruptions force the ecosystem towards the boundaries of its current basin of attraction, 
the ecosystem may cross a threshold, after which the ecosystem will present a new basin of 
attraction17. When the ecosystem changes from one basin of attraction to another, or when the 
ecosystem moves towards the edge of one basin of attraction, it is understood that a “change 
in the stability landscape” has occurred18.  
In the case of change in the stability landscape, the resilience of the system can be 
considered the amount of disturbance the system can absorb before shifting into a different 
configuration, in other words, shifting to a new stability domain19. 
Instead of moving to another basin of attraction, the ecosystem can also remain in a 
dynamic disequilibrium in which there is no global equilibrium condition and the system 
moves in a catastrophic manner between stability domains20.  
Some basins of attraction are more desirable than others and, in view of this, human 
actors may be willing to influence the ecosystem’s movement from one basin to another by 
                                                           
 
13
 Brian Walker et al, Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9(2): 5 
ECOLOGY & SOC’Y (2004), available at http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5/. 
14
 Folke et al, supra note 2, at 119, 121. 
15
 Walker et al., supra note 13. Craig R. Allen et al., Commentary on Part One Articles, in FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 3, 4. 
16
 Walker et al., supra note 13. 
17
 C. S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, 
supra note 2, at 19, 29, 30  
18
 Walker et al., supra note 13. 
19
 Lance H. Gunderson, et al., The Evolution of an Idea - the Past, Present, and Future of Ecological Resilience, 
in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 423, 425. 
20
 C. S. Holling, The Resilience of Terrestrial Ecosystems, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL RESILIENCE, supra 
note 2, at 67, 92 
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reinforcing the resilience of the desirable ones – and thus preventing the ecosystem from 
reaching the threshold of change – or by reducing the resilience of the undesirable basin of 
attraction. This collective capacity of the human actors in the system to manage resilience is 
called “adaptability”21. There are some circumstances in which the ecosystem will not be able 
to return to a basin of attraction, even with aid from human interference. These cases of 
irreversibility of the ecosystem status may occur because of changes in the composition of 
soil or air22.  
Human management of natural elements is traditionally directed towards the 
maintenance of the ecosystem’s stability23. This view of human interactions with the natural 
world focuses on equilibrium states, on “maintaining constancy by reducing natural 
variability”24.  
The relationship between stability and resilience represents the natural cycle of any 
ecosystem: the movement from a stage of slow accumulation of natural capital (stability) 
towards sudden changes, and releases and reorganization of that released capital (resilience)25. 
As the two sides of a coin, both stability and resilience are essential to maintain the 
ecosystem. Besides providing the accumulation of capital, stability allows the different 
elements of the ecosystem (i.e. species of fauna and flora) to enhance their organization and 
connectedness. On the other hand, resilience reduces the connectedness and organization of 
the elements of the ecosystem and releases the stored capital, thereby providing opportunities 
for change, whereby species can reorganize themselves and find new connections among each 
other, resulting in the evolution of the ecosystem as a whole.  
The dynamics of ecosystem organization are very similar to the dynamics of 
technological development, as pointed out by Brooks, “as a particular technology matures, it 
tends to become more homogenous and less innovative and adaptive. Its very success tends to 
freeze it into a mold dictated by the fear of departing from a successful formula (...)”26. The 
                                                           
 
21
 Walker et al., supra note 13. 
22
 C. S. Holling, Engineering Resilience versus Ecological Resilience, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL 
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 58; Folke et al, supra note 2, at 51, 132.  
23
 Holling calls this tendency “engineering resilience”. Holling, supra note 22. 
24
 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 3. 
25
 Holling, supra note 22, at 52. 
26
 Holling, supra note 20, at 105. 
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sudden change that occurs during resilience stimulates the ecosystem to “break the inertia” 
and to innovate. 
As the interchanges between stability and resilience play such an important role in the 
maintenance of ecosystems, human management of ecosystems, which tends towards the 
abolition of disturbances, is greatly disadvantageous. By trying to avoid disruptions such as 
floods or fires, humans contribute to the construction of more vulnerable ecosystems, which 
are expected to suffer even greater crisis after longer periods of time. Holling mentions an 
enlightening example about the fire-combat in national parks in the United States. According 
to him, the “suppression of forest fire has been remarkably successful in reducing the 
probability of fire (…) but the consequence has been the accumulation of fuel to produce fires 
of an extent and cost never experienced before”27. 
Along the same line of reasoning, it is also recognized by Leopold that human control 
over the health of the land has not been successful28. Leopold understands land as the 
community that includes soil, water, plants and animals29, and health as the capacity of the 
land for internal self-renewal30; therefore, very similar to the current meaning of resilience. 
According to Leopold, the land is sick when soil loses its fertility, or washes away faster than 
it forms, and when water systems exhibit abnormal floods and shortages31. The disappearance 
of plants and animal species without visible cause despite efforts to protect them, and the 
irruption of others as pests despite efforts to control them32 are symptoms of the illness of the 
land. 
The loss of biodiversity is both a symptom and a cause of land sickness. Every 
ecosystem contains a few functions which are essential for the maintenance of the 
ecosystem’s main characteristics. Those few functions are developed by a wide range of 
species. Therefore, each function is developed concomitantly by several species, and this is 
called redundancy33. Redundancy of function adds to the stability of systems because, even if 
                                                           
 
27
 Id., at 83. 
28
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 272. 
29
 Id., at 239. 
30
 Id., at 258. 
31
 Id., at 272. 
32
 Id., at 273. 
33
 Allen et al., supra note 15, at 14, 15. 
11 
 
 
©2011 Lia Helena Demange 
the system loses one or a few species, it may keep functioning if at least one of the species 
responsible for that function remains. However, although the function remains and the 
ecosystem maintains its main characteristics, the ecosystem has lost resilience, because it is 
relying on one species only to develop that function. This phenomenon explains why the 
ecosystem keeps working although it is very vulnerable to disturbances. It also explains why 
an ecosystem that has survived the extinction of several species suddenly collapses when the 
last species developing a certain function becomes extinct. 
The system also loses resilience by the loss of species because the range of possible 
connections among species is diminished as are the possible ways the system can reorganize 
after disturbance34. By presenting fewer possibilities to innovate, the system loses much of its 
capacity to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that humans reduce ecosystem resilience by 
removing whole functional groups of species; by altering the magnitude, frequency, and 
duration of disturbance regimes to which the biota is adapted; and by polluting the 
environment, thereby changing the dynamics of climate and the composition of water, soil 
and air35. 
However, just as human actors can interfere in ecosystems and reduce their resilience, 
in the same way they can contribute to the preservation of resilience by adopting a 
conservationist approach towards nature. According to Leopold, conservation  
is a state of harmony between men and land. (…) Harmony with the land is like harmony with a friend; 
you cannot cherish his right hand and chop off his left. (…) The land is an organism. Its parts, like our 
own parts, compete with each other and co-operate with each other. (…) You can regulate them – 
cautiously – but not abolish them36.  
 
Therefore, Leopold considers “the first principle of conservation” to be the 
preservation of all the parts of the land mechanism37. In this context, “parts of the land 
mechanism” may be interpreted as “functions of an ecosystem”. As scientific evidence points 
out that those functions are assured by biodiversity, Folke, Holling and Perrings affirm that 
the conservation of biodiversity cannot be restricted to limited protected areas; it should be 
                                                           
 
34
 Garry Peterson et al., Ecological Resilience, Biodiversity, and Scale, in FOUNDATIONS OF ECOLOGICAL 
RESILIENCE, supra note 2, at 167, 187. 
35
 Folke et al, supra note 2, at 142. 
36
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 189, 190. 
37
 Id.  
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addressed everywhere38. The authors explain that, although preserving biodiversity through 
nature reserves may be an important short-term step, it is not sufficient to solve the problem 
of biodiversity loss, because nature reserves are embedded in larger environments and species 
depend on the reserves’ surrounding area to maintain themselves. According to Askins, 
“small reserves lose their distinctive species if they are surrounded by a hostile landscape”39. 
Ecologists highlight some measures they deem efficient for the preservation of 
ecosystems’ resilience. Leopold considers that the first step towards preserving ecosystem 
resilience is the collection of data about how a healthy land maintains itself as an organism. 
By having this base datum of normality, science may detect what is occurring otherwise 
which might provide the causes for such change. The author points out some characteristics of 
healthy lands already abundantly proved by Paleontology: in healthy lands, wilderness 
maintains itself for immensely long periods; species are rarely lost; and soil is built by 
weather or water as fast as or faster than it is carried away to the sea. The author also calls 
attention to the fact that each biotic province needs its own wilderness for comparative studies 
of used and unused land, as it is impossible to study the physiology of one landscape and 
apply those findings as a basis for comparison with the current status of a distinct landscape40. 
Folke, Holling and Perrings consider that, in order to conserve ecosystem resilience, it 
is necessary to identify the major social and economic forces that are currently driving the 
loss of functional diversity, and to create incentives to redirect those forces. They propose this 
to be done in two ways: by the creation of economic incentives that internalize the external 
costs of biodiversity loss; and by the adoption of measures that apply the idea of preserving 
biodiversity everywhere to economic analysis. According to them, “we should be stimulating 
the development of institutions, policies, and patterns of human consumption and production 
that work in synergy with ecosystem functions and processes”41.  
Referring especially to institutions, Folke, Holling and Perrings consider the 
development of effective institutions for biodiversity conservation as a precondition for the 
                                                           
 
38
 Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160. 
39
 Id., (quoting R. A. Askins, Hostile landscape and the decline of migratory songbirds, SCIENCE 267:1956-
1957).  
40
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 274, 275 
41
 Folke et al., supra note 5, at 160, 161. 
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creation of incentives to prevent the loss of functional diversity. Those institutions should be 
adaptive, which means that they should be able to respond to environmental feedback before 
those effects challenge the resilience of the resource base and the economic activities that 
depend on it42. 
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 Id. 
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THE LAND ETHIC 
 
Aldo Leopold’s land ethic opposes theories that consider nature as an object totally 
submitted to human scrutiny. According to François Ost, the idea of nature as an object dates 
back to Modernity, when Descartes and other philosophers of his time promoted a definitive 
rupture between humans and nature43. With the advance of science, humans became able to 
overcome obstacles to their development posed by nature. Humans acquired the belief in their 
superiority over other species and over nature. From there on, humanity would use science to 
understand nature’s secrets, dominate them and submit nature to human will44. 
According to Christian belief, by altering the land, planting, fertilizing the soil and 
erecting buildings, humans are complementing God’s creation and assuring prosperity45. It is 
by working the land that humans get title to property, both over the land and over the results 
of human work. According to this view, nature is no more than storage of resources46, whose 
use by humans is unrestricted. 
As the transformation of nature by human interference achieved greater proportions, 
humankind became simultaneously geologic agent, climate actor and geo-chemical emitter, 
both influencing and disturbing nature as a whole47.   
In the post-war world people became aware that the planet is vulnerable; that it 
contains limited resources; and that those resources are showing signs of exhaustion. François 
Ost mentions the first view of Earth from space, when satellites first photographed the planet, 
as the crucial moment for this realization48. This moment captures the final triumph of the 
human race over natural limitations and definitely sets humans in command of “Earth craft”49 
when, for the first time, they see the Earth as a fragile pearl in the vast universe. From then 
                                                           
 
43
 FRANÇOIS OST, A NATUREZA ÀS MARGENS DA LEI 30 (Joana Chaves trans., Instituto Piaget ed. 1995). 
44
 Id, at 37, 39. 
45
 According to François Ost, when the biblical chapter Genesis does such statement, it is discretely authorizing 
humans to possess parts of nature.  Id., at 64. 
46
 Id., at 10. 
47
 Id., at 297, (quoting C. ALLÉGRE, ÉCONOMISER LA PLANÈTE, (1990), at 292). 
48
 Id., at 277-387. 
49
 Id., at 277, (quoting J.P. DELÉAGE, HISTOIRE DE L’ÉCOLOGIE. UNE SCIENCE DE L’HOMME ET DE LA NATURE, 
(1991)), at 224. 
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on, humans started to consider how vulnerable the planet they depend upon is and, 
consequently, how vulnerable is the continued existence of the human race as a whole.  
Aldo Leopold is one of the representatives of a generation which became aware of the 
harm humans can cause nature by willing to dominate it. Trying to combat the causes of 
human destructive behavior in relation to nature, Aldo Leopold advocates the adoption of an 
ethical treatment of nature, in which humans would express their love and respect for nature.  
Leopold sees this ethic as the “tendency of interdependent individuals or groups to 
evolve modes of co-operation”, which ecologists call symbiosis50. This ethic started by being 
associated with the relationship between individuals. Later it evolved to include the 
relationship between individuals and human society. According to Leopold, a further 
extension of ethics to include the relationship between individuals and land, fauna and flora is 
“an evolutionary possibility and an ecological necessity”. Land has been just a property to 
humans; their relationship has been strictly economic, entailing privileges but no obligations, 
just as the relationship between citizens and slaves in Antiquity51. 
The extension of ethics to natural elements would, on the one hand, ensure the right of 
humans to manage natural resources, and on the other hand it would recognize the right of 
land, water, animals and plants to continue to exist. Thereby, humans would be showing their 
respect for the other members of nature’s community52.  
According to Leopold, such a change of perspective requires a change in the human 
position: from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it53. The 
conqueror selects which species he deems relevant and which he does not, thereby eliminating 
species whose function within the ecosystem he does not fully understand. The result is 
usually catastrophic, because often the realization that certain species had a main role within 
the ecosystem often occurs when the species is already eliminated from that environment. By 
becoming members of the land-community, humans get in harmony with nature, and this is 
what Leopold considers to be the meaning of conservation54.  
                                                           
 
50
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 238. See also OST, supra note 43, at 290 (stating that the land humans exploit and 
pollute is much more than an object, in fact, is the mother-Earth, with which we live in symbiosis). 
51
 LEOPOLD, supra note 7, at 239. 
52
 Id., at 240. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id., at 189. 
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Leopold acknowledges that we probably are not going to achieve full harmony with 
the land. He places such a goal among other aspirations such as absolute justice or liberty for 
people, which are important to strive for, but not necessarily achievable55. 
Leopold recognizes that modern people have lost much of their connection with the 
land, and this constitutes an obstacle in the way of conservation, as you cannot simply inject 
the idea of striving for harmony with the land cannot simply be injected into one who has no 
relationship with the land56. In order to solve this problem, Leopold recognizes the need for 
education in conservation, which should be primarily based on promoting curiosity about land 
mechanisms and building ethical support for land economics. The author believes that, if this 
is set in place, conservation will naturally follow. 
The lack of education in conservation and knowledge about land mechanisms is also 
an obstacle for to the development of a land ethic. For Leopold, the establishment of an 
ethical relationship with land requires love, respect and admiration and a high regard for 
land’s value. A person cannot love, respect and admire something he or she does not know. 
That is why the land ethic requires some understanding of ecology. It also requires social 
approbation of right actions and social disapproval of wrong actions. According to Leopold, 
the path to determine the “right” and the “wrong” actions is the following: 
Quit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of 
what is ethically and esthetically right, as well as what is economically expedient. A thing is right when 
it tends to preserve integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. it is wrong when it tends 
otherwise.57 
 
Leopold says that, without an ethical relationship with nature, conservationists are 
obliged to look for economic values to justify efforts to conserve natural elements. Therefore, 
people strive to identify how a function developed by certain species can help human 
economic activities and how the loss of such service provided by nature would harm the 
economy.  
By recognizing the role of economic values in ecological functions in trying to 
conserve some species, Leopold calls attention to the conservation of species that are not 
useful to the economy, either because their function is still unknown or because their function 
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supports the ecosystem as a whole, but not a specific human activity. According to him, 
conservation directed by the market does not cover such species, and this can result in their 
extinction and therefore in an increase the vulnerability of an ecosystem58.  
Another problem of conservation as driven by markets is that it does not provide an 
education for conservation. People take measures towards conservation as long as they are 
going to receive something in return. As soon as the economic incentive is withdrawn, the 
conservation measure is discontinued. Market incentives for conservation also fail to promote 
a sense of right and wrong. Even though contributing to conservation, the individual who 
receives a payment to conserve a species or an ecosystem service is driven by self-interest, 
not by a sense of obligation or by the sense that it is the right thing to do59.  
Leopold believes that economic incentives for conservation also present the problem 
of depending too much on government for implementation. He believes that expecting that 
governments will be able to promote conservation everywhere through economic incentives 
or even with traditional regulation is to raise expectations to a level that exceeds 
governments’ possibilities. Governments have inherent limitations and cannot be everywhere 
all the time. In such a context, by internalizing in people the sense of right or wrong in 
relation to nature, the land ethic would promote conservation even where governments cannot 
reach60. 
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ECOSYSTEM RESILIENCE IN THE LAW 
 
The law is the system employed by organized societies to declare, systematize and 
implement the essential values of a society. The law contains certain inherent characteristics 
and methods that can lead to innovative solutions to common problems. As mentioned by 
François Ost61, the law operates by systematically considering all relevant points of view, 
putting them in proportion and comparing them. Most importantly, in an ideal situation, the 
law is capable of taking into account all pertinent facts and divergent interests, balancing 
them, and reaching a reasonable and desirably just decision62.  
The capacity to balance divergent interests is being introduced more and more in the 
elaboration of policies and decisions by agencies through the advent of “public participation 
in decision making”. Although inserting public participation in such matters is necessary for 
democratic governance and for preventing social and environmental damage caused by the 
implementation of ill-planned policies, mechanisms for public participation are mostly not 
binding and are restricted to the procedural obligation of hearing divergent interests. 
Therefore, the agency usually is obliged to hear the interested parties, but not to take their 
concerns into account when reaching a decision; this obligation remains exclusively reserved 
to the Judicial branch.  
Even when agencies are able to provide substantive public participation in decision 
making, they cannot accomplish the task of defending the interests of those who are not 
present in the process: nature itself and the future generations. Differently, the law can ensure 
representation of those interests during its weighing and balancing process, especially if so 
directed by a legal principle. 
Due to the need to enforce consideration of all the interests at stake and the interest of 
nature itself and of future generations, management for resilience, so called adaptive 
management, cannot be implemented solely by agencies and executive planning and 
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procedures; it requires the guidance of a legal principle and enforcement by the Judicial 
branch.  
This article will analyze how environmental law may influence human decisions 
guided towards the achievement of ecosystem resilience. It will do so by consolidating a new 
principle of law, the principle of resilience, and by applying this principle to relevant areas of 
environmental law. 
 
The origins and content of the principle of resilience 
 
The concept of ecological resilience radically changes the manner by which 
humankind manages natural resources because it annuls the premise that management should 
seek stability. In order to guide the public administration and individuals in dealing with this 
change of mindset, this article proposes consolidation of the principle of resilience as a new 
principle of international law. 
As will be demonstrated in this topic and in the topic “The principle of resilience in 
International Environmental Law”, the foundations of the principle of resilience already exist 
in International Environmental Law. It is already buried within other principles of 
environmental law. However, it must be acknowledged and must become an independent 
principle in order to guide humankind on how to stop degradation of global nature and how to 
attend to growing population needs in the context of climate change and other natural 
disturbances in a manner that will stop degradation and strengthen global nature. 
The importance of systematizing a new principle to address ecosystem resilience relies 
on the function principles exercise in the international sphere. Principles of international law 
designate fundamental legal norms and values that should be pursued by the whole 
international environmental law system. Principles also indicate essential characteristics of 
legal institutions, and provide the rationale for the law and the general orientation to which 
positive law must conform63. The principle may be included in States’ practices and in 
national laws, and may be referenced by judges as guidance for interpreting or filling the gaps 
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in national or subnational law.  It provides a framework for negotiating and implementing 
new and existing agreements and may be incorporated in legally binding international 
instruments. Moreover, it provides the rules of decision for resolving transboundary 
environmental disputes. Finally, the principle may assist the integration of international 
environmental law into other fields of international law64. 
But what would be the meaning of the principle of resilience?  
Several factors would influence the shape of such a principle, including: the ecological 
concept of resilience; the link between management of ecosystems and resilience; the values 
that the human community wants conservation to have; and the existing principles and 
concepts of environmental law, especially the concept of intergenerational equity.  
From the ecological concept of resilience we conclude that resilience requires the 
preservation of biodiversity and the preservation of nature everywhere. Keeping in mind that 
the goal of preserving biodiversity for resilience is to keep the functions of the ecosystem and 
the land mechanism working with their original quality, we conclude that resilience requires 
biodiversity to be preserved in its original habitat and that each species be represented by a 
quantity of individuals sufficient to ensure the execution of the ecosystem function they are 
responsible for65. 
As previously mentioned, the goal of preserving nature everywhere brings quite a 
challenge to environmental conservation. Some may argue that nature conservation is already 
done everywhere, because environmental laws are applied in the whole territory of a 
country’s jurisdiction. In favor of such argument, it is possible to argue that environmental 
law regulates not only reserved protected areas, but also the use of natural resources outside 
protected areas, in landscapes that have been intensively transformed by humans and where 
the emission of pollutants may threaten human health and environmental quality, or where the 
killing of a certain species can cause the extinction of that species.  
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There are no doubts about the validity of such arguments. However, we should have in 
mind that when we discuss resilience we are not talking about the maintenance of some 
natural resources everywhere; we are talking about the preservation of the whole land 
mechanism everywhere. The concept of resilience is based on the idea that every land 
mechanism – that means, every ecosystem function and every natural element of an 
ecosystem (which includes fauna, flora and inanimate elements) – is important to keep the 
ecosystem resilience. Therefore, such thinking requires a much more complex and broader 
view of conservation than the one currently applied to non-reserve-protected areas, where 
environmental law is very segmentally applied to preserve some individual endangered 
species or just the inanimate elements of the environment (soil, water and air). As 
conservation seeks to preserve very complex structures such as ecosystems, it is not possible 
to attribute to conservation a simplistic or segmented view. Conservation for resilience must 
take into account the interconnections between the various components of an ecosystem and it 
must include in the concept of “land” not only the forests and preserved landscapes, but also 
the landscapes intensely modified by humans.  
The dichotomy that determines a place for nature, where conservation is needed, and a 
place for humans, where conservation is not needed, must be abolished. Humans are part of 
nature and nature is everywhere. And if it is not everywhere, it should be. It should be in the 
cities, in the houses, in the industries, keeping the ecosystem functions alive, interconnecting 
the elements of the natural world. If every house in a city has a garden with the same species 
that compose the ecosystem in which the city is located, the fauna and flora present in each 
garden may interconnect with each other and keep the functions which make that ecosystem 
unique. The wider the area where nature is conserved and the more connections with fauna 
and flora are kept, the more resilient the ecosystem will be. 
Along this line of reasoning, the concept of ecological resilience nurtured the concept 
of the “social-ecological” system, which emphasizes the interconnectivity between humans 
and nature and stresses that the delineation between social and ecological systems is artificial 
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and arbitrary since social-ecological systems have powerful reciprocal feedbacks and act as 
complex adaptive systems66. The concept of adaptive governance is based on this premise. 
In order to determine the values that conservation for resilience should have, this work 
will be based on the values promoted by Aldo Leopold in land ethic. Therefore, the principle 
of resilience is guided by the aspiration of getting in harmony with the land - all the land, not 
just some elements of it. According to the principle of resilience, humans are members of the 
land-community, not conquerors of it, and they should get to know the land mechanism as 
much as possible, in order to respect and love the land. This principle also includes social 
approbation of actions that tend to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community, and social disapproval for actions that tend otherwise. The principle refuses to 
address land-use as a solely economic issue and to rely only on the government or on the 
market to take conservation measures.  
Aldo Leopold also believes that humankind should cultivate love and respect for the 
land mechanism. Based on this statement, this article interprets the land ethic as requiring 
humans to enhance the land mechanism the maximum they can, and not to merely prevent 
and mitigate the aggressions imposed upon nature that the law mandates individuals to 
address. That means that besides the legal obligation to do no harm to the environment, 
humans have the ethical obligation to improve environmental quality.  
By improving the environment wherever possible, we humans demonstrate that we are 
conscious of the burden we inflict on the land mechanism; we respect the land mechanism 
that supports our existence; and we assume our ethical responsibility to aid the land 
mechanism in any way we can in return for what it provides us. This duty is not only 
individual, but also societal.  
The ethical obligation to live in harmony with the environment and to improve 
environmental resilience characterizes an ethical principle. According to Taylor, to be 
considered so, a moral principle must present six formal characteristics67: it must be general in 
form, meaning that its applicability is not restricted to a limited group of people, rather, it is 
addressed to the global audience;  it must be universally applicable to all moral agents, 
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meaning that the rule cannot defeat itself if everyone attempts to comply with it; it must be 
intended to be applied disinterestedly, meaning that compliance with the principle is required 
even when it is against the moral agent’s interest; it must be advocated as a principle for all to 
adopt, meaning that whoever adopts it approves its adoption by all others; it must override all 
non-moral norms or concerns. 
One of the major aims of the principle of resilience is to provide guidelines for a 
governmental policy pursuant of the maxim: “Do not solely mitigate: improve”. In order to 
improve the environment and at the same time ensure essential economic activities, the 
principle of resilience will push governments towards innovative environmental management 
solutions that proportionately balance environmental and economic activities, in order to do 
not prioritize one interest and suffocate the other. Such solutions are called “innovative” 
because they provide new guidelines for the operation of the law; for example, by stimulating 
different patterns of production and consumption, or different governmental goals, or unusual 
rules for land use and planning. 
Incorporating the background provided by ecology and ethics, the principle of 
resilience can be established as follows:   
• The land mechanism has inherent value. 
• Every person has the right to use natural resources as long as such use does not 
impair the use by others or the persistence of the original setting of mutually 
reinforcing processes and structures of an ecosystem.  
• Every person has the moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in 
harmony with the land mechanism.  
• In order to ensure ecosystem resilience to natural or human-made disturbances, the 
human management of natural or urban landscapes shall preserve ecosystem 
functions through:  
o the preservation of all species everywhere; 
o the preservation of natural cycles; 
o and the preservation of chemical composition of soil, air and water. 
• The lack of scientific understanding regarding the function of land mechanisms and 
the role developed by single species in such mechanisms shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to enhance ecosystem resilience.  
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• States shall ensure that the younger generation receives education on the function of 
natural mechanisms and that the government officials receive training in identifying 
human activities and natural phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.  
• Governments are responsible for identifying the factors that put ecosystem resilience 
at risk and addressing such factors.  
• Management for resilience requires the adoption of adaptive management techniques, 
or other techniques that comprise monitoring of results, evaluation of policy 
performance and review of policy measures according to the assessment of results and 
changes of circumstances. 
• Patterns of production and consumption in synergy with ecosystem function shall be 
stimulated. 
• The resilience of ecosystems shall be considered in the assessment of costs and 
benefits of any activity or policy that affects the environment.  
 
The principle of resilience in International Environmental Law 
 
Basic elements of the principle of resilience are already present in international 
environmental law.  
The Preamble of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment, 1972, recognizes that protection and improvement of the human 
environment is the duty of all Governments68. The enhancement of resilience is a matter of 
protecting and improving the environment and that is why Governments have the duty to 
consider resilience when managing natural resources. 
Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration declares that “man … bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations”. 
Therefore, the duty to improve the environment is not solely governmental, but also 
individual. 
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The first part of Principle 1969 of the Stockholm Declaration highlights the role 
education for conservation has to play in protecting and improving the environment. 
The World Charter for Nature, 198270, contains several elements of the principle of 
resilience. Among the principles of conservation, it proclaims that: 
Preamble: every form of life is unique, warranting respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord 
other organisms such recognition, man must be guided by a moral code of action 
1. Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be impaired… 
4. Ecosystems and organisms … shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable 
productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or species 
with which they coexist… 
6. In the decision-making process it shall be recognized that man’s needs can be met only by ensuring 
the proper functioning of natural systems … 
9. The allocation of areas of the earth to various uses shall be planned, and due account shall be taken 
of the physical constraints, the biological productivity and diversity and the natural beauty of the 
areas concerned. 
10. (d)  Non-renewable resources which are consumed as they are used shall be exploited with 
restraint, taking into account … the compatibility of their exploitation with the functioning of 
natural systems. 
11. (d)  Agriculture, grazing, forestry and fisheries practices shall be adapted to the natural 
characteristics and constraints of given areas; 
11. (e)  Areas degraded by human activities shall be rehabilitated for purposes in accord with their 
natural potential and compatible with the well-being of affected populations. 
15. Knowledge of nature shall be broadly disseminated by all possible means, particularly by 
ecological education as an integral part of general education. 
19. The status of natural processes, ecosystems and species shall be closely monitored to enable early 
detection of degradation or threat, ensure timely intervention and facilitate the evaluation of 
conservation policies and methods.  
 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992, recognizes that human 
beings are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature (Principle 1). At 
Principle 4, the Declaration determines that environmental protection shall constitute an 
integral part of the development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it. At 
Principle 8, the Declaration guides States to reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption71.  
The need to build ecosystem resilience not only to reduce the risk of disaster, but also 
due to its importance in providing sustainable livelihoods, flow of goods and services and 
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reducing vulnerability to climate change is explicitly expressed in international documents, 
such as the United Nations, 2009 Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction72. 
Foundations of the principle of resilience can also be found in other principles of 
international environmental law.  
The principle of sustainable development requires present generation to meet its needs 
“without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”73. This idea 
requires humankind to stop exploiting natural resources at a rate greater than their capacity for 
regeneration, the so called sustainable yield.  However, despite the recognition of sustainable 
development as a basic principle of environmental protection and national planning, humans 
still consider that they have the right to take from nature a little more than the sustainable 
yield threshold, thereby gambling with nature.  
The sustainable development movement did not succeed in inserting in people’s minds 
the idea that ensuring continuity of natural resources is more important than individual short-
term profit. Neither did it convince people that personal ambition has to yield in face of 
environmental limitations or the survival of future generations will be at risk.   
By trying to please all concurring interests at once, the sustainable development 
movement did not make it clear that, in order to keep the “health of the land”, humans often 
need to prioritize values and goals, which not so rarely will result in restricting economic 
activities and economic growth where the land mechanism cannot support it any longer. The 
implicit meaning commonly attributed to “sustainable development” by business and even by 
countries is that private initiative will protect the environment as long as such protection does 
not impair economic activity. While the sustainable development movement succeeds on 
raising awareness about the need to conciliate environmental protection and development, it 
fails to provide guidance on the following ethical questions: when economic activity and 
environmental protection cannot be conciliated, which interest should be prioritized and under 
what circumstances? The vacuum left by the concept of sustainable development is repeatedly 
filled by business interests, who have a quick answer at the tip of the tongue to the 
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abovementioned question: economic growth ALWAYS has priority over environmental 
protection concerns.  
Such an omission leaves the establishment of priorities to be determined on a case by 
case basis, with no overarching directive guideline. Thereby, the legal framework has 
assigned an equal treatment both to environmental and economic interests. However, such 
“equal” treatment hides a fundamental injustice when one considers that environmental and 
economic interests are not balanced because the latter counts on much greater political power. 
Therefore, following the lesson given by Aristotle, the aspiration for justice requires the law 
to treat equally the equals and unequally whoever is in an unequal position74. This primary 
function of the legal system can be developed by the application of the principle of resilience, 
which fills the vacuum left by the sustainable development concept by advocating that 
ecosystem resilience and continual provision of ecological functions must be preserved, even 
if it requires a reduction of economic growth and economic profits. Thus, the principle of 
resilience prioritizes environmental protection, artificially balancing a situation that is 
naturally unbalanced. By this means, the principle of resilience improves the legal system as a 
whole by correcting an ongoing injustice in the management of natural resources and planning 
for development. 
 The principle of resilience does not acknowledge rules for prioritizing concurring 
interests solely because it is necessary to enforce sustainable development under an ethical 
and legal point of view: it does so also because it is a factual necessity. Several works 
affirmed that human society has to learn how to develop socially and manage natural 
resources without relying on economic growth75. Such works reinforce the need to give 
priority to environmental protection when it is not possible to conciliate it with economic 
growth. Considering the green economy’s goal to generate wealth through sustainable 
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exploitation aiming to eradicate poverty76, the idea of developing without growth should 
apply to developed countries and countries that have already accumulated enough wealth to 
combat poverty. The green economy cannot be green if deprived of the understanding that the 
economy should be kept in a steady state if economic growth cannot be achieved within the 
limits imposed by the sustainable yield of natural resources. 
The concept of common concern of humankind, for example, determines that, as the 
planet is ecologically interdependent, humanity has a common interest in protecting the 
environment and may have a collective interest in certain activities that take place, or 
resources that are located, wholly within State boundaries77. Therefore, as a consequence of 
this concept, States share the responsibility not to cause harm to issues of common concern 
and to address common concerns78. By attributing common responsibilities and interests to all 
States, this concept creates obligations erga omnes both to prevent and to address the harm 
done to common concerns. Those obligations have procedural implications, as explained by 
Kiss & Shelton: 
In traditional international law, only an injured state could bring a claim against the state which caused 
the injury in violation of international law. Where the common interest is infringed, however, all states 
may be considered to have suffered a legal injury, with the obligations designated as obligations owing 
to all states, i.e., as obligations erga omnes.79  
 
  Although the concept encloses an important procedural consequence, the downside of 
classifying the protection of the environment as a whole as a common interest is that it 
attributes a strong legal classification to too broad a subject, which has the negative effect of 
non-compliance. The principle of resilience can have an important role to play in this regard 
by providing a more detailed interpretation of the concept of the common concern of 
humankind. This interpretation would show that the object of the common concern of 
humankind is the preservation of ecosystem functions and the preservation of biodiversity in a 
space as extensive as possible.  
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The concept of intergenerational equity focuses on future generations as rightful 
beneficiaries of environmental protection. It encloses the notion of fairness both among the 
individuals of the present generation and between present and future generations. The concept 
of intergenerational equity is composed of three elements: conservation of the diversity of 
natural and cultural resources by maintaining alternative resources within each category; 
conservation of environmental quality by preventing the exhaustion of higher quality 
resources; and equitable or nondiscriminatory access to Earth’s resources80. This last element 
guides the distribution of access to natural resources both for present and future generations. 
As for the conservation of diversity and the quality of resources, the aim is to implement 
equitable access to resources by guaranteeing future generations’ capacity of choice among 
alternative resources, and by guaranteeing access by future generations to resources of the 
same level of quality as the resources exploited by present generations. 
This concept requires that present generations use the resources sustainably and avoid 
irreversible environmental damage81. In this context, the principle of resilience increases the 
applicability of the concept of intergenerational equity by restraining the present generation 
from weakening a non-resilient ecosystem. As mentioned before, a non-resilient ecosystem is 
so vulnerable to disturbances that, when passing through movements between basins of 
attraction, the passage to a new basin of attraction may be irreversible and the regeneration of 
the original features of an ecosystem may be impossible. 
Furthermore, the principle of resilience contributes to the application of the second 
component of the concept of intergenerational equity – the conservation of environmental 
quality – by requiring the preservation of integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic 
community.  
The precautionary principle prescribes the need for taking anticipatory actions in order 
to avoid environmental harms, even when the scientific understanding of a specific threat is 
not yet complete. The principle of resilience also contributes to the implementation of the 
precautionary principle: first, because it seeks to enhance the resilience of ecosystems in order 
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to prevent their vulnerability and degradation; and, second, because it proposes the 
conservation of all ecosystem functions, even those that are not yet fully understood.  
The principle of non-regression determines that the creation of norms that contribute 
to the degradation of the environment is considered a violation of several international 
instruments whose aim is to protect the environment82.  
The principle of non-regression is based on three theoretical elements. First, it is based 
on the assumption that environmental law seeks to prevent the degradation of the environment 
by constantly improving environmental quality. Second, it is based on the premise that the 
present generation cannot impose its laws on future generations. According to Michel Prieur, 
if present generations gradually adopt less protective environmental laws, they will prevent 
future generations from fully exercising their right to a healthy life83. Third, the principle of 
regression relies on the application of the concept of intangibility of human rights to 
environmental regulation. The concept of the intangibility of human rights is implicit in 
human rights conventions and stands against the regression of those rights. It is transposed to 
environmental law because of the effect that the degradation of environmental laws may have 
on the exercise of human rights.  
The principle of non-regression, in national law, guides the creation of norms by both 
the Legislative and the Executive branches and is enforced by adjudicatory authorities, which 
are responsible for the control of the legitimacy of acts perpetrated by the other Powers.  
The principle of resilience can assist the application of the principle of non-regression 
by providing guidelines to assist judges in determining whether a norm represents regression 
of environmental conservation or not.  
Some may argue that the principle of resilience would be redundant and dispensable in 
guiding judges in deciding whether a norm increases or decreases the level of environmental 
protection because the principle provides the same criteria that could be provided in court by 
ecologists’ testimonies. However, this kind of criticism constitutes an incomplete 
interpretation of the principle of resilience by considering solely the ecological aspect of the 
principle. This argument fails to realize that the principle of resilience comprehends not only 
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an ecological concept, but also the relation of the ecological concept to the law and to the 
ethics that govern the relationship between humankind and nature. The principle of resilience 
commits the ecological concept of resilience to the protection of future generations’ interests 
and to the ethical goal of living in harmony with nature. This principle also introduces the 
concept of ecological resilience to the legal framework not as a mere judicial finding based on 
scientific data, but as a full legal principle of environmental law, which, as such, must be used 
to guide the creation and the interpretation of any environmental norms or any policies or 
norms that generate environmental consequences. 
The principle of non-regression is truly effective in achieving improvement of 
environmental quality only if it is applied to all norms that generate consequences to the 
environment. In other words, the principle of non-regression should be applied not only to 
environmental, but also to economic, policies and norms that affect the environment, and the 
same applies to the principle of resilience. 
The principle of resilience is also strongly influenced by three environmental 
principles that deal with governance for conservation: the subsidiarity principle; the public 
participation principle; and the principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate. These 
three principles guarantee the participation of local levels of government, the affected public 
and the international community in the decision-making process related to environmental 
issues.  
The subsidiarity principle reflects a preference for making decisions at the lowest level 
of government or social organization where the issue can be effectively managed. This 
principle has a procedural nature: it determines the level of the policy-making hierarchy in 
which the decision should be made, but it does not guide the kind of decision that should 
result. The final decision will be taken not only by balancing local interests, but also by 
balancing national or international priorities. 
The public participation principle exists because environmental issues are best handled 
by the participation of all concerned citizens at the relevant level. However, individuals 
cannot appropriately participate in decision making if they do not receive the relevant 
information on the issue. Therefore, the public has the right of access to information held by 
public authorities regarding the environment, and the State has the duty to encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information available.  In order to exercise their right, 
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individuals should also have equal access to justice, through the judicial and administrative 
proceedings provided by the State. 
The principle of good neighborliness and duty to cooperate determines that 
international environmental issues be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries84. This 
principle is binding because it derives from a general principle expressed in Article 1.3 of the 
United Nations Charter, which sets among the purposes of the United Nations the 
achievement of international cooperation in solving international problems.  
The three above mentioned principles for environmental governance are very relevant 
for the achievement of ecosystem resilience especially because they expand the range of 
stakeholders involved in efforts for conservation. Such principles abolish the idea that 
environmental conservation is to be promoted only by national governments. Therefore, the 
application of these principles prevents the situation criticized by Aldo Leopold whereby 
conservation efforts implemented only by the government are deficient because they do not 
internalize in the public the ethical value of conservation and because they only reach places 
where the governmental structure is present.  
The principle of resilience is also an essential part of the duty to assess the 
environmental impact of proposed activities, policies, or programs to integrate environmental 
issues into development planning. Before implementing activities or policies, the State has the 
duty to fully identify and consider their environmental effects and to give the affected citizens 
the opportunity to understand the proposed project and to express their opinions about it 
through public participation in decision making.  
As the duty of the State is to fully identify and consider environmental effects, it is 
very clear that such a duty applies to the identification and consideration of any impact the 
project may cause to the resilience of the ecosystem. From this conclusion it is extracted that 
the governmental entities must understand the concept of ecological resilience and must be 
trained to include assessment of impacts on ecosystem resilience in the environmental impact 
assessment. In order to fully exercise their right to participation in decision making, 
individuals and citizen organizations should also seek to understand the meaning of 
ecosystem resilience. 
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The implementation of the principle of resilience through the use of environmental 
impact assessment procedures will be considered in greater detail in the section of this article 
“Applying the principle of resilience”. 
 
Legal status of principles of International Environmental Law 
 
 The principles of international environmental law have their origins in a wide variety 
of sources, which include: environmental treaties; soft law instruments; the United Nations 
General Assembly Resolutions; arbitral decisions; judicial decisions of the International Court 
of Justice; expert commentary85; application of general principles of international law to 
environmental issues86; and customary international law87. 
Soft law instruments88, the United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, and expert 
commentary do not bind States. Arbitral and judicial decisions bind only the States under 
litigation and only if such States accept the jurisdiction of the arbitral commission or of the 
International Court of Justice. Environmental treaties may create obligations to signatory 
States. General principles of international law create binding obligations to all States. 
 According to UNEP, the legal status of international environmental law principles and 
concepts is varied: some are firmly established, others are emerging and gradually gaining 
acceptance; some have the nature of guidelines or policy directives and do not give rise to 
specific rights and obligations. The juridical effect of principles and concepts may change 
from one legal system to another, depending on the context of the case, the activity at issue, 
the actors and the geographical region89. In other words, environmental principles and 
concepts may be binding or not binding, depending on the circumstances of the case, on the 
countries involved and on the nature of the principle or concept. 
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 Both binding and non-binding principles of international environmental law play 
primarily a role of anticipation rather than reaction to environmental problems90. In other 
words, the true purpose and capability of international environmental norms is to prevent 
environmental hazards on a global scale, not to punish States that violate these norms. As a 
matter of fact, this tendency is noticeable not only in international environmental law, but also 
in public international law as a whole.  
 Common obligations of international environmental law can be shared by all the 
States when they have an erga omnes characteristic, or when these obligations can be shared 
by several States, when they are established by multilateral agreements. The target of such 
obligations is to diffuse potential threats to the world as a whole, rather than to a specifically 
injured State. There is some controversy among the experts whether each State has an 
automatic right to react on behalf of the common interest against any breach of common 
obligations.  
Benedetto Conforti argues that States not directly injured by the violation of the 
international obligation are not automatically entitled to react. This is different from directly 
injured countries, which have the right to seek measures such as reparation and reprisal91. On 
the other hand, Oscar Schachter states that every party to a multilateral agreement would have 
a sufficient legal interest to sustain standing to redress92.  
The differences in the analyses promoted by both authors are motivated by their 
different focus: Conforti focuses on countries’ reactions to violation of international law, 
which include self-help measures; on the other hand, Schachter limits his interpretation to the 
judicial reaction, stating that uninjured countries would have sufficient legal standing to bring 
claims on behalf of the common interest.  
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As noted by Michel Prieur in an interview given to a Brazilian journal93, the current 
punishment for a violation of an international obligation regarding environmental issues 
hardly goes beyond moral condemnation or the symbolic finding of violation. This is due to 
the nonexistence of a court of justice specializing in international environmental crimes.  
Summarizing, although countries not injured directly have no right to pursue unilateral 
measures to react to a violation of international environmental law, they have standing to 
bring claims to adjudication. However, as there is not yet an appropriate court where such 
claims can be filled, the violation of international environmental norms remains largely 
susceptible to mere moral and political condemnation. 
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APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF RESILIENCE 
  
The applicability of the principle to sectors of a country’s legal system requires the 
prior development of a conceptual framework for decision-making based on the principle of 
resilience. 
Any country seeking to apply the principle of resilience needs, first of all, to recognize 
it as a moral principle. Therefore, the country must recognize the inherent value of nature and 
guide its decisions towards the accomplishment of the goal to live in harmony with nature.  
As noted by Aldo Leopold, the goal to live in harmony with nature is not necessarily 
achievable, but it is something we should strive for94. Also, it is useful to remember that the 
acceptance of the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism as a moral principle 
presupposes that compliance with this duty is required even when it is against the moral agent 
interest95. 
Employing the principle of resilience in decision-making requires that it be recognized 
as a legal principle, after it has been recognized as a moral principle. In order to ensure 
enforceability of the legal principle, it is important to incorporate it into a Code or into a 
country’s framework environmental legislation. A country’s framework environmental 
legislation represents “an integrated, ecosystem-oriented legal regime that permits a holistic 
view of the ecosystem, the synergies and interactions within it, and the linkages in 
environmental stresses and administrative institutions”96, which is precisely what the 
implementation of the principle of resilience requires. 
After being acknowledged in a statute, the legislature or the resource management 
institutions should create a procedure for the implementation of the principle of resilience. It 
is recommended that the government analyze where the principle of resilience can be 
incorporated into existing procedures related to legal protection of the environment. The 
recommendations addressed in the section dedicated to Environmental Impact Assessment 
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and to the incorporation of adaptive management into the circle of risk management 
(Adaptive Management section) are good examples of how this can be done.  
In other circumstances, the fulfillment of the principle of resilience’s aims will require 
the creation of new procedures. The organization of workshops for adaptive management and 
the creation of development rights to address the loss of real property to the sea in coastal 
areas (Land use section) are examples of innovations in procedural rules. 
Besides incorporating the principle of resilience into procedural rules, the government 
should set penalties for lack of compliance with these rules. As for penalties for 
noncompliance with the principle of resilience, it is interesting to note that the concept of 
ecological resilience reveals another level of environmental degradation: the destruction of 
ecosystem resilience. When the action perpetrated by a project is responsible for eliminating 
the resilience of an already vulnerable ecosystem, the damage this project caused to the 
environment is much graver than the damage produced by the same action in a resilient 
ecosystem. For example, if a project is responsible for eradicating one single pollinizer 
species, the consequence of this impact will be much graver for an ecosystem that counts on 
no other species to fulfill the pollination function than in an ecosystem that has many other 
species providing this service.  
In this context, a pertinent question for the legislator would be: should the penalty for 
whoever destroys the resilience of a certain ecosystem be greater than the penalty applied to 
whoever perpetrates the same action, but does not produce this result? 
In setting the penalties, legislators should seek to employ the penalty as a means to 
achieve concrete results in improving environmental quality through measures of education 
for environmental conservation; restoration of an ecosystem’s resilience; collection of 
information for adaptive management; enhancement of sustainable consumption and 
production patterns.  
These kinds of goals are found in the Writ of Kalikasan, in the Philippines. This writ 
was created to enforce the individual constitutional right to a “balanced and healthful 
ecology”. The remedy can be claimed by any natural or judicial person acting on behalf of 
persons whose environmental right was or is in danger of being violated. The writ awards no 
damages to individual petitioners; rather its reliefs include directing the respondent to 
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permanently cease the action or activity that gave cause to the violation of environmental 
laws; and to restore the environment97. 
In the State of Amazonas Environmental Court in Manaus, in Brazil, alternative 
penalties have been proposed by Judge Adalberto Carim Antonio to violators of 
environmental laws, according to the transgressions. Instead of jail or fines, respondents can 
opt to restore the environment and to bring additional benefits to the affected community, to 
take classes in environmental education, or to act as volunteers in environmental protection 
organizations, among many other innovative penalties98. 
In order to ensure compliance with the principle, governments should establish who 
will enforce attainment to the principle guidance and to its procedural rules. The enforcement 
can be provided by citizen suit provisions, by environmental courts, or by a specific 
governmental institution vested with special rights to sue violators - such as the Brazilian 
Ministério Público99.  
 
Adaptive governance 
 
Adaptive governance is a method that employs the understanding of how ecological 
resilience works to the governance of decision making within resource management 
institutions, thereby enhancing the mutual influence of social and ecological systems. That is 
why adaptive governance seeks to increase the adaptability of the social actors in order to 
enhance their capacity to reorganize social systems within desired states in response to 
disturbing events, such as changing environmental conditions100.  
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“Adaptive governance conveys multi-objective reality when handling conflicts among 
diverse stakeholders and, at the same time, adapts this social problem to resolve issues 
concerning dynamic ecosystems”101. In the end, adaptive governance orients how decisions 
will be made having in regard the information collected by adaptive management and the 
divergent social interests influencing certain issues whose roots are social and resource 
management related. 
The adoption of patterns of consumption and production that work in synergy with 
ecosystem functions and processes is an application of adaptive governance. In this matter, 
the example  of the project “Alcântara: sustainable city”102, in Brazil may be mentioned. In 
this project, the aim of enhancing the economic growth of the city was joined to the concern 
of producing a commodity that would improve ecosystem quality and the functioning of 
society. Due to the national potential for producing biofuels, ethanol was the commodity 
chosen to boost Alcântara’s economic growth. However, instead of using the rural area of 
Alcântara to introduce crops of sugar cane, which are not native and are not adapted to the 
local ecosystem, the project’s proponents decided to produce ethanol from “maripuera”, a 
byproduct of the local production of cassava flour, which contains cyanide. Instead of merely 
developing an economic activity with the least impact on the surrounding ecosystem, this 
project actually improved the environmental quality of the region, as the cyanide had 
previously been dumped anywhere to seep into the ground. 
 
Adaptive governance in international law 
 
Adaptive governance is an efficient way of implementing Principles 17 and 13 of the 
Stockholm Declaration, which deal with governance for enhancing environmental quality. 
Principle 17 declares that “appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of 
planning, managing, or controlling the environmental resources of States with the view to 
enhancing environmental quality”. Principle 13 declares that “States should adopt … 
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development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible with the need to protect 
and improve the human environment”103. 
There are now discussions about introducing some features of adaptive governance 
techniques into institutions on the international level. The need for a flexible institutional 
framework for sustainable development in order to address new and emerging issues has been 
recognized by most of the countries attending the Second Preparatory Meeting of the United 
Nations Convention on Sustainable Development of 2012104. Many countries called for: 
greater participation of stakeholders in the environmental institutional framework; integration 
of mechanisms at the national, regional and international levels; and enhanced coordination 
and cooperation among all international organizations, agencies and conventions to ensure 
implementations of commitments and promote synergies105. Such intentions show a clear 
trend toward shaping international environmental governance according to the propositions of 
adaptive governance. 
The trend towards the adoption of adaptive governance at the international level is 
stressed by the intent of several countries to strengthen the monitoring of policies and 
programs aimed at implementing multilateral environmental agreements. Such an intent is 
expressed by the countries’ statement in favor of the enhancement of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), which is seen as the only forum in which 
sustainable development is addressed in an integrated fashion106. CSD is responsible for 
reviewing and monitoring progress in the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, as well as providing policy guidance to follow 
up the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation at local, national, regional and international 
levels107.  
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Adaptive governance in domestic law  
 
Adaptive governance is profoundly influenced by a country’s approach to decision-
making. The relationship of the principle of resilience to the main approaches to decision-
making is analyzed below.  
 
Cost-benefit Analysis 
 
The cost-benefit approach provides that government agencies conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) before enacting major regulation. CBA requires a quantitative and qualitative 
accounting of the effects of regulation, in which the reasons for action must be explained 
when costs exceed benefits. CBA is based on the premise that the accounting of regulation 
effects can give citizens and officials a full sense of what is at stake when making 
decisions108.  
CBA seeks to test the efficiency of government actions. Efficiency is the term 
employed by Economy to designate economic transactions that generate greater benefits than 
costs to society.  Economic efficiency provides us with criteria to evaluate the functioning of 
government109, because regulation and governmental decisions are unlikely to promote social 
welfare if the costs are high and the benefits are low110. Therefore, CBA avoids the diversion 
of government resources from their most beneficial uses to less beneficial ones111. 
Besides evaluating and enhancing the efficiency of government actions, CBA also 
assists in overcoming cognitive problems that can lead people to misunderstand the 
magnitude of the risks, thereby putting things in perspective and preventing government from 
being indifferent to dangerous threats or from giving exaggerated attention to small problems 
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that cause great public commotion. Thus, CBA can increase or decrease attention to safety 
compared with the status quo112.  
The benefits of governmental actions are often immaterial and must be translated into 
monetary values to be considered in the cost-benefit analysis113. In CBA, economists try to 
mimic the operation of the market in order to provide the monetary evaluation of the benefits 
of life, health and nature itself114.  
Through CBA, life, health and nature itself lose their ethical value and are subsumed 
into a monetary amount during the weighting of governmental policies. Worse, as such 
benefits are felt in the long term and time affects the value of financial resources, nature, life 
and the health of future generations tend to weigh very little to present generations115. In this 
context, prevention of fatalities that would occur in the long-term are just worthwhile when 
their number is very large or the cost of precautions is very low116. Discounting future 
benefits and foisting threats on future generations underestimates humanity’s care about their 
progeny, which is a basic moral value of any human culture.  
The cost-benefit approach treats individuals solely as consumers117, whose interests 
and rights are determined by their capacity to pay. In this context, nature is just one of many 
benefits that can be achieved for a certain price. Under this approach, it is impossible to get 
away with the notion that the relationship between human and nature is marked by 
domination. The maintenance of the cost-benefit approach towards the management of natural 
mechanisms makes building harmony between humans and the land mechanism most 
unlikely. 
The CBA tends towards an expertise-dominated approach, which is akin to the 
irrational weigher theory. Under this theory, individuals rely solely on their visceral and 
affective reactions to recognize risks when they lack information or when they are presented 
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with any other limit on their ability to engage in more considered assessments. The proposed 
regulatory approach for this theory is based on shielding law from the “distorting” influence 
of emotion and public irrationality by delegating regulatory power to politically insulated 
experts who evaluate costs and benefits in a reasoned fashion118.  
The expertise dominated approach is criticized for not respecting individuals’ factual 
beliefs and for shielding regulatory law from citizens’ visions of the good society119, which is 
an insult to citizens’ dignity120 and obviously against democratic values. Contrary to what the 
expert dominated approach would suggest, emotion is not a substitute for information, but 
rather a type of evaluative judgment by someone who has already had access to information 
and time to reflect about it. According to the cultural evaluator theory, emotions enable the 
individual to identify the opinion most appropriate to his or her individual commitments, 
values, and ideals. The integration of emotions with risk perception equips decision makers to 
discern issues of justice and ethical values, which cannot be assured by any set of 
procedures121.  
The cost-benefit analysis approach seems to tend towards less regulation. Empirical 
studies have demonstrated that costs are often substantially overestimated in the cost-benefit 
analysis elaborated prior to regulation, probably because cost estimates often originate from 
the regulated industries themselves, who have great interest in defeating regulatory 
initiatives122. Also, cost-benefit analysis usually does not anticipate innovation and gains in 
efficiency stimulated by regulation. Therefore, the method tends to overestimate the costs and 
to underestimate the benefits of any environmentally protective regulation. This may explain 
the common perception that U.S. experts and policymakers – who adopt the cost-benefit 
approach – favor less conservative environmental, health, and safety measures than their 
European counterparts – who adopt the precautionary approach123. 
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In the absence of a regulation forbidding or imposing greater burdens on 
environmentally harmful activities, governments that seek to stimulate environmental 
protection usually resort to the creation of economic incentives in order to encourage the 
adoption of environmentally friendly solutions when there are cheaper alternatives in the 
market. In this context, the adoption of a cost-benefit approach, the reduction of regulation 
and the increasing deployment of market incentives are connected and mutually reinforcing. 
In the United States, the tradition of adopting cost-benefit analysis to evaluate risks 
and alternative mitigation measures dates back to 1981, during the Reagan Administration124. 
President Nixon’s Executive Order 12,866125 provided that in deciding whether and how to 
regulate, agencies should assess all the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, 
including the alternative of not regulating; and choose the approach that maximizes the net 
benefits.   
It is possible to identify a recent tendency towards the pragmatic approach in the cost-
benefit American tradition after the enactment of President Obama’s Improving Regulation 
and Regulatory Review Executive Order126. The pragmatic approach is a reorientation of the 
cost-benefit approach which attempts to introduce the consideration of values that society 
holds in high regard into the cost-benefit analysis.  Therefore, the pragmatic approach 
recognizes the limits of technical expertise and the role of social values in decision-making 
considerations. Such an approach is centered on statutory priorities and on justifying why 
particular policies are preferable to others127. President Obama’s Executive Order reviews the 
cost-benefit analysis in the American federal government by strongly emphasizing public 
participation in the process and encouraging consideration of benefits that are difficult to 
quantify such as “equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive impacts”128.  
The application of a cost-benefit approach in determining the appropriate response to 
risks hampers the deployment of adaptive management techniques in governmental agencies 
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because of the difficulty of assessing with a high degree of certainty the costs and benefits of 
measures to mitigate the risk of a natural event. The risk of a natural event can hardly be 
estimated from the historical record because of the variability of natural systems. In addition, 
the harm caused by a natural event is partly a function of human siting decisions as well as 
precaution and response systems, which may be difficult to assess129.  
Besides the difficulty of assessing the risks of a natural event, and the benefits that 
adaptive management would generate in preventing them, the CBA for an adaptive approach 
is spoiled by a common misinterpretation of the costs of environmental regulation. One of the 
costs governmental agencies include in CBA for environmental regulation is the amount of 
benefits that society will lose by restricting or prohibiting an economic activity. The issue 
observed in this context is that the benefits of environmentally harmful activities are usually 
known before their costs to the environment and to society are fully assessed, because the 
assessment of benefits is in the interest of the entrepreneur, who has the greater knowledge 
about the activity being developed. Corroborating this is the fact that sometimes the downside 
of an activity has a latency period, during which the negative effects cannot be assessed. 
Many examples can be given of this phenomenon, such as the Polychlorinated Biphenyl 
(PCB) substance largely used in industrial and commercial applications from 1929 to the 
1970’s due to its non-flammability, chemical stability, high boiling point, and electrical 
insulating properties130. Only after fifty years of usage was the substance banned in the United 
States and other countries due to its devastating health effects131.  
Because the benefits of a new activity or product tend to be assessed prior to its costs, 
the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory agencies is most likely to conclude that the activity 
presents high benefits and uncertain costs. Based on this finding, the agency is likely to decide 
on regulatory inaction because the regulator will lack safety arguments for imposing a 
regulatory burden on an activity that presents a mere hypothetical possibility of generating 
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costs that outweigh its benefits to society. An example of this situation was observed in the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s review of nanoparticle-containing sunscreens, when the 
agency treated situations of deep uncertainty regarding the potential impacts of novel 
technological processes as unworthy of regulatory attention132.  
In summary, the adoption of cost-benefit analysis as the sole approach to the decision-
making process of weighing alternatives hampers the creation of protective environmental 
regulation; the adoption of adaptive management by agencies; and the consideration of ethical 
values in decision-making, such as the inherent value of nature, and the goals of living in 
harmony with nature and caring about future generations.  
On the other hand, cost-benefit analysis makes for government efficiency, which is an 
important value of administration and cannot be forsaken. However, even solely examining 
the contributions of cost-benefit analysis to governmental efficiency, it is fair to say that this 
method is not sufficient to address governmental efficiency because it is too much centered on 
efficiency in the short term. Its techniques for discounting the future, its limitations on 
predicting the benefits of protective measures (which include both protective regulation and 
adoption of adaptive management) and its overestimation of the costs of environmental 
protection prevent it from being taken as a complete tool to address governmental efficiency 
in the long term.  
Ensuring efficiency in the long term for the management of natural resources is the 
aim of green economy and a requirement of sustainable development and of the principle of 
resilience. If cost-benefit analysis cannot provide efficiency in the long term, it obligatorily 
must be coupled with other approaches to decision making that are compromised with it. 
The need for combining cost-benefit analysis with other approaches to decision 
making also appeals as a matter of justice. Cost-benefit analysis employs an economic method 
for solving disputes between economic and environmental interests. Of course such a method 
is more appropriate to quantify economic interests than any other sort of interest and clearly 
the method itself will contribute to the achievement of decisions that tilt towards economic 
interests. 
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Due to this trend, the recognition of the principle of resilience as a legal principle and 
the commitment of procedural rules with the achievement of justice requires cost-benefit 
analysis to be just one of the phases of decision making, and not the entire process.  
The application of the principle of resilience to the decision making process points 
towards the introduction of a weighing phase, where the administrative organ has to weight 
the experts’ opinion (represented by the result of the cost-benefit analysis) with input from 
public participation and with environmental conservation values recognized in statute. In this 
context, the recognition of environmental conservation values by the law is extremely 
important because the courts’ power of review over agencies’ decisions is usually restricted to 
reviewing the legality of the act – the court cannot decide on questions of merit, in respect to 
the Separation of Powers. If the law does not require the agency to consider certain 
conservation values in its decisions, the courts cannot oblige the agency to do so. 
One may argue that weighing ethical values in decision making is not part of the 
functioning of many governmental agencies nowadays and, for that reason, the fulfillment of 
this requirement can endanger agencies organization and good functioning. For this reason, 
education and training of government personnel on environmental conservation and its values 
is very important. Education for conservation extended to the whole society is also important 
to provide citizens with tools to exercise oversight of agencies’ actions through citizen suit 
provisions or others means of public participation in decision making. 
Also, it might be interesting to consider the establishment of a separate entity to opine 
how a proposed project or policy might endanger the interests of next generations and nature 
itself. This entity could be created based on the Hungarian ombudsman for next generations. 
The Hungarian ombudsman can address constitutional complaints regarding violations of 
Hungarians’ right to environmental protection and a healthy environment; promote research 
on topics of interest; and do parliamentary advocacy, for example, by pointing out how legal 
drafts can impact the interests of next generations133. 
 
Precautionary principle 
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The precautionary principle guides decision makers to take precautionary measures 
when an activity can cause serious or irreversible harm to human health or the environment, 
even if cause and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically134.  
The advent of the precautionary principle is related to a common deficiency in the 
application of the preventive principle. According to the preventive principle, when an 
activity has been scientifically proven to cause harm, the proponent must take measures to 
prevent, mitigate or compensate for the harm. However, the lack of reliable monitoring data 
on the long-term cumulative and combined effects of harmful activities on complex 
ecosystems often leads to uncertainty regarding the scientific assessments of environmental 
impacts135. The lack of scientific certainty of cause and effect relationships was the motive for 
the creation of the precautionary principle in order to guide decision-makers in the very 
frequent occasions where they are required to decide how to address potential, uncertain or 
even hypothetical threats, which can make the consequences of inaction serious or 
irreversible136.  
The precautionary principle acknowledges the complexity of ecosystems and the 
limits of human understanding of natural mechanisms. That is the reason why the principle 
adopts an ecosystem approach, rather than fragmenting environmental protection in single-
species or single-natural-function approaches137. That is also the reason why the relationship 
between the precautionary principle and science is marked by a culture of humility about the 
sufficiency and accuracy of existing knowledge when dealing with environmental, health, and 
safety regulation138. 
Even though the precautionary principle acknowledges scientific uncertainty when 
there is not sufficient evidence regarding ecosystem functioning, or on the probabilities of 
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adverse outcomes, nonetheless, the principle attributes an important role to science. Science 
recognizes and quantifies environmental problems, thereby reducing management 
uncertainties; science provides key evidence to guide decision makers as to which risks are 
graver and on which management actions should be prioritized; experts also provide decision 
makers with alternatives for action and assess which alternative is safer under a scientific 
point of view139. 
Decision making attendant to the precautionary principle is not made solely based on 
the information provided by science; the precautionary principle is applied on a case-by-case 
basis, where scientists inform decision makers, who weigh up the scientific knowledge with 
value judgments of a moral, cultural, economic and political nature140. If decision makers do 
not chose the alternative that scientists have considered the safest one, decision makers must 
justify their choice141. This rule allows decision makers to diverge from scientists while at the 
same time providing the public with means to evaluate the legitimacy of decision makers’ 
choices. 
Along with the scientific knowledge and during the weighing process, decision makers 
are also advised by the FAO technical guidance on the precautionary approach142  to consider 
traditional, indigenous and local resources users’ knowledge of how the ecosystem functions. 
These groups have an intense and long-lasting relationship with the surrounding environment, 
through which they construct an empirical knowledge that often covers longer periods of 
observation than scientific studies do143. The importance attributed to non-scientific forms of 
knowledge in the design of public policies is another consequence of the acknowledgement 
that science is not absolute. 
The precautionary principle recognizes the importance of the well-being of non-
human entities, the intrinsic value of ecological systems and, therefore, the moral obligation 
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of humankind to protect vulnerable or critical natural systems144. In this respect, the principle 
is much aligned to the premises of the land ethic.  
The precautionary principle is guided by the premise that society must not be 
paralyzed by the lack of scientific knowledge and, therefore must take action to protect health 
and the environment145 even when facing uncertainty. Thus, the precautionary principle 
guides decision makers to respond to deficiencies of understanding by constantly reevaluating 
and improving learning and knowledge146. Consequently, the precautionary principle requires 
a high degree of information and monitoring147.   
The recognition of limited knowledge and the emphasis on taking action and on 
learning leads to the conclusion that error in environmental management is highly possible. In 
order to protect the environment from such errors, the precautionary principle recognizes the 
need for preparedness to provide ecological space for recovery from potential policy mistakes. 
Preparedness against errors can be achieved by leaving a margin of error when establishing 
harvest limits148.  
 The precautionary principle challenges the current legal, political, social and economic 
system on many grounds. First, the principle deals with uncertainty, while traditional legal 
systems rely on certainty and predictability. Second, the moral obligation to protect the 
environment contradicts the modern western belief that human interests, such as material 
growth, always have pre-eminence over non-human interests. Third, as above mentioned, the 
principle requires leaving a margin of error when establishing harvest limits, which is against 
the market logic to maximize the revenue by exploiting all available resources. Forth, the 
principle requires long-term economic and social considerations, in order to prevent decision 
makers from taking no notice of the abundant benefits of preventing irreversible damages that 
would be felt in the medium and long-term future. Fifth, the principle challenges policy 
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makers to promote an inter-disciplinary consideration of factors that influence decision 
making when weighing the information available about an uncertain threat149.  
 The precautionary principle is abundantly present in soft and hard law agreements 
(Rio Declaration, UNFCCC, CBD, Stockholm Convention on POPs, Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety, European Community – Treaty of Rome) and in state practice and judicial opinion. 
However, it has not been fully applied in rulings of international courts150. 
When there are concerns regarding unknown but potentially devastating threats to 
natural systems that are thought to be of fundamental and irreplaceable importance to 
humanity, the precautionary principle guides decision makers to assess what would be the 
worst possible outcome and to align their decisions to prevent the occurrence of such event. 
That guidance is called the maximin principle.  However, the applicability of the maximin 
principle is limited and it is not recommended for times when the costs of precaution become 
immoderate or unacceptably large. When an activity can pose serious threats to the 
environment, but the costs of prohibiting it are too burdensome, the precautionary principle 
advises governments and private actors to “do the best they can” to mitigate the negative 
impacts of such activity151. This commitment is implied in United States pollution control 
statutes which require the installation of the best available pollution abatement technology152. 
The precautionary principle entails a shift in the burden of proof onto proponents and 
developers. This measure aims to prevent the environment or human populations from bearing 
the burden of uncertainty. The shift in the burden of proof corrects a defect of traditional legal 
systems that disallow claims for compensation for accidents and acts of God, which 
disincentive developers from taking adequate precaution measures153. 
The precautionary principle provides a few guidelines for decision makers to consider 
during the weighing process. First, decision making should be transparent and it should allow 
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public participation154. Second, decision makers must consider the proportionality of 
protective measures in relation to the level of security to be achieved155.  
Adaptive management is also often referred to as a means to implement the 
precautionary principle156 in risk management, although some authors understand that 
adaptive management and the precautionary principle are incompatible157. Adaptive 
management is a useful tool for the precautionary principle because it stands for taking action 
for conservation even when there is no complete understanding as to which would be the most 
appropriate protective measure. Adaptive management, such as the precautionary principle, 
recognizes the value of learning from experience and of monitoring policy effects, keeping 
risk regulation to a perceived threat updated over time158. Also, other tools of the 
precautionary principle, such as the shift of the burden of proof, can provide a valuable aid to 
the adaptive management learning process by incentivizing research and understanding by 
developers and activity proponents on imperfectly characterized threats159. 
Besides the affinity with adaptive management, the precautionary principle shares 
other premises and values held by the principle of resilience. Therefore, the precautionary 
principle can make a great contribution to the implementation of the principle of resilience, 
especially regarding the reconciliation of adaptive management, public participation, legal 
predictability and legitimacy, and the ethical and ecological values of the principle of 
resilience. 
The precautionary principle reinforces the notion that political communities retain 
special responsibility to evaluate the effects of their decisions not only on themselves, but also 
on those is not involved in the decision process, such as other societies, future human 
generations and nature itself160. Thereby, besides being an opportunity to maximize welfare 
functions, the policy making process becomes a forum for discussions regarding the 
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obligation of the regulating body towards these non-represented groups161. Acknowledgement 
of such a responsibility attributes a collective moral identity to social choices162. By this 
means, the precautionary principle establishes the correlation between policy choices and 
ethics. 
Like the principle of resilience, the precautionary principle acknowledges that 
humankind’s obligation to protect the environment has a moral justification.  However, the 
principle of resilience goes further, acknowledging that society must not only protect the 
environment, but also adopt ways of life that are in synergy with ecosystem functions, 
especially regarding patterns of production and consumption.  
Besides recognizing these societal moral duties, the principle of resilience also 
recognizes the individual moral duty to respect nature and to pursue a way of living in 
harmony with the land mechanism. The precautionary principle promotes the saying “do the 
best you can” regarding activities that cause environmental impacts but that are, nonetheless, 
necessary and irreplaceable for society. In the same way, the principle of resilience 
acknowledges that humans have a moral responsibility to do their best to aid the land 
mechanism to maintain its mutually enforcing processes as a recompense for the benefits the 
environment provides us and for the unavoidable burdens we inflict on the land mechanism.  
Also common to both principles is the idea that humans must take action to comply 
with the moral obligation to protect the environment, even when the scientific knowledge on 
impacts and their solutions is not yet complete. Therefore, unlike cost-benefit analysis, both 
the principle of resilience and the precautionary principle point towards regulatory action in 
the face of uncertainty. 
Adaptive management decisions should demonstrate the adoption of the policy 
alternative that presented the greater synergy with ecosystem functions. If such an alternative 
is not adopted, policy makers must justify the reason priority was given to the other value. 
The lack of justification or the lack of sufficient evidence to support the decision may 
motivate judicial review of the agency’s decision. 
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Some interpretations of the precautionary principle attribute particular importance to 
the preservation of fundamental ecosystems functions, such as the proposal to employ “safe 
minimum standards” to Earth’s life-support systems facing potentially devastating threats, in 
order to protect them whatever the cost163.  This application of the precautionary principle can 
enforce the ecological goal of the principle of resilience to preserve ecosystem functions and 
prevent irreversible changes in stability domains. 
Because the information available prior to decision making is not complete or 
conclusive, the precautionary principle places great responsibility and discretion on decision 
makers to do the weighing process. In order to prevent the process from becoming opaque, 
thereby losing legitimacy, the precautionary principle requires enhanced means of public 
participation and accountability of the decision makers within a public administration164.  
Besides the lack of conclusiveness of any scientific evidence, some authors mention 
other aspects of management in the face of uncertainty that can impoverish legitimacy. 
Barbara Cosens observes that adaptive management requires the expansion of agencies’ 
discretion to decide and to change strategies based on the assessment of results. In addition, 
this approach ascribes to scientists a key role in interpreting the data and in recommending 
solutions. Because in a democracy legitimacy is achieved by the government of 
representatives elected by citizens, the concentration of power on non-elected representatives 
is seen as a reduction of decision-making legitimacy165. 
Nevertheless, agencies already had substantial responsibility for decision making 
before the implementation of the precautionary principle and the advent of adaptive 
management. Since recognition of the need to prevent environmental impacts and the 
adoption of the preventive principle, agencies were required to prove the potential impact of 
an activity in order to justify environmental regulation166. Besides that, the enlargement of 
agencies’ decision power is also due to their expertise in making decisions on complex issues 
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and in solving issues about the interpretation of statutes faster and with a greater level of 
detail than Congress167, which was a reality even before the precautionary principle arose. 
Therefore, part of the impoverishment of legitimacy caused by the implementation of 
the preventive principle is remedied by the precautionary principle, since the influence of 
scientists in decision making is controlled by political decisions taken by the heads of 
agencies during the weighing process. On the other hand, the impoverishment of decision 
making legitimacy due to the transfer of decisions from the legislature to agencies can be 
addressed by ensuring that there is enough publicity and public participation in the decision-
making process. In addition, such problems can be addressed by greater Congressional and 
Judicial oversight of agencies and by the employment of mechanisms proposed by Economic 
Law literature to prevent agency capture. 
Besides legitimacy, the law also makes claims for predictability, which is a very 
challenging goal when dealing with uncertainty and adaptive management. Theorists on 
adaptive management usually reject the use of regulation in the face of uncertainty168 and 
management approaches that seek to replace the uncertainty of resource issues with the 
certainty of a process169.  
It is true that surprises are inevitable and that institutions managing for resilience must 
be flexible. It is also true that the uncertainty of a management problem cannot be replaced by 
a procedure. However, it does not mean that flexible institutions cannot observe any 
procedure. As pointed out by Cosens, procedural rules provide legitimacy to acts of public 
administration governed by the Administrative Law170. Therefore, public administration 
cannot simply get rid of procedure. By the same token, agencies can act only within the limits 
of power delegated by Congress. The limitation of agencies power and agencies’ obligation to 
follow the rules determined by Congress and by the agency itself ensure to Congress and to 
society that the agency will not exceed those limits and, if it does, that it will be reprimanded 
for that. It is not possible to have Congressional, Judicial or citizen control over agencies if it 
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is not perfectly clear which rules and procedures they must submit to. Without this control of 
one governmental branch over the other, it is not possible to maintain a republican state. A 
proposal of institutional design cannot ignore such basic legal premises and rules of power 
distribution in national states; otherwise it risks never being adopted and implemented at all.  
The delegation of power to agencies and the establishment of a procedure for adaptive 
management can be formulated in a manner to attend to both the legal need for predictability 
and procedural legitimacy, and the need to establish a method to guide the long-term process 
of adaptive management. Aiming to attend to those two interests, this article proposes a 
general roadmap for regulation for adaptive management. 
The norm enacted by Congress which delegates power to an agency can provide 
guidelines for the structure of policies and norms that should be created by the agency. For 
example, the norm can establish that every policy created must define: goals; actions; predicted 
results; time frame to launch actions in short, medium and long term; methods of monitoring; 
the entity competent to do monitoring; deadlines for collection of monitoring data and for 
release of monitoring results; and penalties for not complying with deadlines and guidelines 
determined by the delegation statute.  
Through the design of an adaptive management model coupled with basic regulation, 
agencies have a certain freedom to determine the content of policies, while the regulation 
structures a method. The establishment of a method is essential because it attends demands of 
legal, political and scientific levels. From a legal perspective, the pre-determination of a 
procedure attributes greater legitimacy to the process, ensures legal predictability, and 
facilitates oversight by the legislature, by the Judiciary and by the public.  
From a political perspective, the establishment of a procedure ensures the continuity of 
the process even if the agency personnel change along with changes in government. It is 
widely known that changes in government are a major cause for discontinuity of policy 
measures and plans. The determination of a procedure can aid in the solution for this aspect 
by forcing the agency to create long-term planning and goals, which will ensure the continuity 
of management measures and which will have to be considered by the next generation of 
decision-makers.  
From a scientific perspective, the establishment of a procedure or method is natural to 
the beginning of any research project or of any policy analysis. Therefore, such a measure is 
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useful because it conciliates the need for legitimacy and predictability with the scientist’s 
interest in flexibility in determining the content of the policy. 
Ecologists usually consider that regulation is not best suited to guide the management 
of ecosystems with regard to unknown threats because this kind of management does not 
provide the flexibility required for dealing with the unexpected171. For such cases ecologists 
suggest the use of adaptive management tools.  
Although this work recognizes the value of adaptive management as a way of 
rendering environmental regulation more flexible, it supports the view that the implementation 
of an adaptive management process not supported by environmental regulation is 
inconceivable. The reason for this is quite simple: the management of ecosystems necessarily 
requires the imposition of restraints on actions perpetrated by private actors, because every 
ecosystem supports anthropic activities which will be affected by a regulation aimed at 
enhancing ecosystem resilience. As the actions of private actors can only be constrained by 
rules of law, an adaptive management not supported by regulation would have very limited 
implementation and efficacy. 
The authors who advocate adaptive management usually prefer market incentives to 
command-and-control regulations, as if they were independent of each other. However, in 
order to be successful, any market incentives depend on the scarcity of whatever is tradable. 
As the market does not naturally attribute value to an ecosystem’s functions or services, 
market incentives always depend on a command-and-control regulation aimed at internalizing 
environmental costs and attributing scarcity and value to the ecosystem’s services. Therefore, 
adaptive management will always require some basic regulation. 
 
Adaptive Management 
  
The change in stability domain can motivate several human reactions: humans can do 
nothing and wait to see if the system will return to some acceptable state; or they can actively 
manage the system and try to return it to a desirable stability domain; or they can admit that 
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the system is irreversibly changed and, hence, that the only strategy is to adapt to the new 
altered system172. The first reaction – to do nothing – is hardly an option because human 
activities and human lives depend on the ecosystem and the choice for inaction can represent 
not only economic losses, but also the loss of lives. Therefore, humans need to manage 
ecosystems sometimes for a return to a past condition, sometimes to adapt to an unavoidable 
new condition. Due to the complexity of ecosystems, humans often lack complete 
understanding about the processes that lead towards changes in stability domain. That is why 
resource managers usually have to deal with uncertainty.  
Literature recognizes adaptive management as the most suitable approach for dealing 
with ecosystem complexity and the uncertainty generated by unknown threats173. This 
management method is centered on feeding ecological knowledge into management 
organizations by constantly improving understanding of ecosystem dynamics through the 
interpretation of data periodically collected by observation and monitoring174. 
Adaptive management is a result-based approach to management by agencies; its final 
goal is to continuously enhance environmental quality. The adaptive management process 
mainly consists in specifying objectives when addressing a management problem, articulating 
a policy and evaluating the performance of the policy175. Adaptive management has great 
potential for dealing with ecosystem resilience because this method relies on the observation 
and interpretation of essential processes and variables in ecosystem dynamics176, constantly 
using this knowledge to reevaluate and modify the management strategy. During the 
evaluation process, a critical understanding of the effects of the policy creates an experience 
platform upon which informed policy designs and meaningful choices can be based in the 
future177.  
Adaptive management distinguishes itself from conventional management because it 
focuses on managing essential ecological processes that sustain the delivery of harvestable 
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resources and ecosystem services at multiple temporal and spatial scales178, while the 
conventional approach focuses on the assessment of the maximum sustainable yield of an 
individual species at a single scale179. The protection of groups of species that develop the 
same function at different scales reinforces the resilience of that function and enables that 
function to be maintained despite sudden variations within specific scales180.  
 
Obstacles to the adoption of adaptive management  
 
There are a few characteristics of risk perception that may influence political 
mobilization towards the adoption of adaptive management measures. It has been noticed that 
involuntary exposure to risk is regarded by the public as less tolerable than voluntary 
exposure. This might be explained by the fact that voluntary exposure presupposes that people 
have both the knowledge about the risk and the freedom to choose to undertake the risk, thus 
acknowledging people’s autonomy, equality and individual power – ideals most valued by 
modern society. In the same sense, involuntary exposure to risk is seen as a signal of 
uncontrollability and uncertainty181, which is usually condemned by modern society.  
Probably for this reason, resource managers try to reduce the public perception of 
uncertainty towards risks of natural disasters. They do so by ignoring most uncertainty; by 
breaking the problem into trivial questions, thereby achieving a spurious certitude; or by 
replacing the uncertainty of resource issues with the certainty of a process182.  
Differently from the above mentioned reactions, adaptive management recognizes the 
uncertainties of risks and confronts them183, which may give the public the false impression 
that under adaptive management there is greater uncertainty than under other sorts of 
management methods. In this context, the environmental principle of information plays an 
important role in order to inform the public about the uncertainties inherent in any 
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management method, thereby dissipating the false impression.  It is expected that the potential 
reluctance of public opinion to accept this method can be defeated by showing that adaptive 
management is more suitable for dealing with uncertainty precisely because it does not hide 
uncertainty.  
The perception of risk also poses obstacles to adaptive management because natural 
disasters get less attention than human-made events184; therefore there is less public pressure 
towards the prevention of natural disasters than towards the prevention of terrorists’ attacks, 
for example. When dealing with disasters, people are concerned not only with safety, but also 
with responsibility and guilt, and as natural disasters are not considered to be caused by 
humans, they are thought of as nobody’s responsibility185. Adaptive management hardly will 
be able to change this perception, unless the increase in collection of information enables 
managers to identify which specific human-made actions caused certain environmental 
hazards.  
Experience shows that the presence of certain circumstances can block the 
development of adaptive environmental assessment and management or can make it not 
recommendable. It occurs when an ecological system completely lacks resilience; institutions 
lack flexibility; designing experiments presents technical challenges; natural resources present 
certain characteristics that make experimentation impossible; or design analysis concludes 
that the risks of failure are socially and legally unacceptable186. These circumstances affect a 
manager’s capacity to experiment and learn from experience, which is a decisive feature of 
adaptive management187. Also, because adaptive management needs room for 
experimentation, it goes against market logic because it proposes the maintenance of a 
minimum level of untouched and/or economically unused resources in order to preserve the 
ecosystem’s ability to reorganize itself. 
There is still reluctance among environmental agencies to implement adaptive 
management. It is a method too complex, time consuming and often expensive – factors very 
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common to processes that involve scientific investigation and democratic debates with 
insights from public participation.  
As administrators pursue short term efficiency in their management methods, they 
usually employ first the simplest management alternatives and leave adaptive management to 
be used as the tool of last resort, when none of the others were effective188. The downside of 
this reality is that adaptive management is employed when ecosystems are already very 
distressed – at such a time, adaptive management cannot provide substantial aid because it is 
not appropriate for ecosystems that have no resilience left.  
The latency and irreversibility of some risks deny managers the fruits of trial-and-
error, because, under these circumstances, the effects of an action are only identified years or 
decades after implementation, when actions cannot be corrected anymore189. It is expected 
that by enhancing the resilience of the ecosystem, managers will reduce the probability of 
irreversible effects because the ecosystem will have wider capability to adapt to different 
circumstances. However, if the ecosystem totally lacks resilience, managers will not be able 
to rely on adaptive management for dealing with risks with potential latency and 
irreversibility because adaptive management entails experimentation. 
 Certain legal measures can be taken to attenuate or remove the obstacles to the 
implementation of adaptive management. These measures are explained below. 
 
EIA and related tools 
 
The EIA related tools can contribute to the transfer of information required by the 
implementation of adaptive management by predicting the potential impacts of policies; by 
assessing the alternatives; and by ensuring public access to information and participation in 
the decision process.  
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Tools such as strategic environmental assessment or area wide assessments are of even 
greater importance in enhancing adaptive management considering that most of the surprises, 
classified as local and cross-scale190, could be predicted and monitored through the integration 
of information of local and regional scale. 
EIA can also help in implementing adaptive management at the project level by 
requiring, during the process of renewal of the license, the reevaluation of an activity’s 
impacts and of its mitigation measures. Therefore, instead of renewing environmental licenses 
without further questioning, agencies could evaluate whether the mitigation measures that 
condition the license were efficient and whether new mitigation measures are needed.  
Aiming to prevent the repeated incidence of such situations, several measures tending 
to simplify the adaptive management process can be employed. First, environmental 
departments should unify the methodologies employed in the collection of ecosystem data 
within the several EIA related tools – such as the EIAs itself, the SEAs, and the EMSs – 
because lack of standardization is often a reason why available data cannot be used in 
modeling and why it has to be recollected by adaptive managers191. By this means, the 
environmental department will focus on managing and analyzing the available data rather 
than on collecting it. Second, the models developed by managers to aid in the understanding 
of the functioning of the ecosystem have to be kept as simple as possible and the predictions 
of the need for new data should be constantly reviewed in order to prevent the collection of 
irrelevant data192.  
 
Risk evaluation, disaster preparedness and recovery 
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Disasters are the impacts that hazardous events have on people and property. Such 
impacts are determined not only by the magnitude of the event, but also by human interaction 
with nature and by our choices about where and how we live193. No disaster is completely 
natural because the degree of impact that a natural event causes to humans is highly 
determined by human exposure and vulnerability to risk, which is a product of cultural 
patterns influenced heavily by law194. Therefore, law has an important role to play in 
preventing emergencies, especially through the elaboration of emergency plans and land use 
regulation. The success of disaster law is judged by its results in minimizing disaster costs as 
a whole, as well as minimizing disparate impacts on vulnerable communities195. 
In summary, disaster law is the legal area dedicated to eliminating or reducing the 
disturbance caused by known and unknown threats. As for unknown threats, there is an area 
of overlapping between adaptive management and disaster law that justifies the application of 
the principle of resilience in this legal field. 
There is a clear interconnection between vulnerable ecosystems and natural disasters. 
The increasing vulnerability of ecosystems noticed in the last decades has been followed by 
records that cause concern regarding the intensification of impacts caused by natural 
hazards196.  
Therefore, enhancing ecosystem resilience is an efficient way to achieve greater levels 
of safety regarding natural disasters. This fact has already been recognized by the best 
literature on disaster management. Faber et al acknowledges that land use planning that 
exacerbates disaster risk; failure to maintain green infrastructure; and climate change are 
among the main causes for the recent increase in disaster occurrence197. The United Nations 
Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction 2009 listed among the strategies for 
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protecting green infrastructure the need to build ecosystem resilience and to promote 
integrated planning, in which both environmental and disaster risk considerations are factored 
into land use and development planning198. The 2011 version of the UNISDR Report 
mentioned that investing in green cities may be a more cost-effective means of reducing urban 
flooding than expensive investments that increase storm drainage capacity199. 
By the same token, disaster management would be enhanced by the insertion of 
concerns with ecosystem resilience, in the same way that environmental protection would be 
much enhanced by the introduction of ecosystem resilience into disaster law. That is so 
because often measures taken for emergency response are potentially harmful to the 
environment and could be replaced by more environmentally friendly alternatives, if decision 
makers were considering the environmental effects of their actions.  
The relationship among flood occurrence, land use patterns and the construction of 
levees is an example of this kind of situation where disaster management can choose between 
a sustainable or an unsustainable solution. Both land use regulation and levees are means to 
control flood risk: the former prevents the formation of ecologically sensitive areas200; the 
latter exacerbates the risk of flooding downstream in catastrophic events when the levees are 
overtopped201. Consequently, the avoidance of floods by land use regulation represents a 
disaster mitigation measure that is both environmentally friendly and more efficient in 
preventing natural disasters.  
Disaster planners should be aware that concerns about ecosystem resilience and 
ecosystem services prevent the occurrence of disasters altogether, thus generating benefits not 
solely to the environment, but also to property safety and, more importantly, to human lives.  
However, the assessment of the United Nations Global Assessment Report on Disaster 
Risk Reduction 2011 shows that national policy worldwide202 has been tending otherwise: 
less progress was made integrating disaster risk management into environmental policies in 
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2009-2011 than in 2007–2009203.  This is the result of overlapping responsibilities and 
legislation which hamper governmental efficiency in addressing environmental and disaster-
related problems.  
The application of the principle of resilience to disaster management expands the 
reach of disaster law concerns: besides considering solely the impacts hazardous events cause 
to human and property safety, disaster law is supposed to also consider the impacts such 
events cause to ecosystems. The inclusion of environmental concerns in disaster preparedness 
goals was already acknowledged by 168 States in 2005, when the Hyogo Framework for 
Action was adopted. This Framework aims to achieve a substantial reduction of disaster 
losses, in lives and in the social, economic and environmental assets of countries and 
communities by 2015. 
Governmental and legal responses to disasters rely on the circle of risk management, 
which is composed of mitigation, emergency response, compensation, and rebuilding204. 
Mitigation involves prevention and protection against the impacts of major events on lives 
and property, which might include preventive measures such as investigations regarding the 
full nature and source of the threat, or disruption of illegal activity, and protective measures 
aimed at reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to deter, 
mitigate or neutralize major disasters. Protection also includes elevated awareness, 
identification and promotion of effective sector-specific protection practices. Emergency 
response involves the activities that address the short-term, direct effects of an incident. 
Compensation and rebuilding are elements of the emergency recovery phase, which also 
involves long-term care and treatment of affected persons and the development, coordination, 
and execution of site and services restoration plans205.  
The application of the principle of resilience to disaster law will be facilitated if 
adaptive management concerns and procedure are included in the circle of risk management. 
Once the vulnerability of ecosystems to disturbances is itself a risk to human health and 
human activities, the assessment of ecosystem resilience should be employed in the mitigation 
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process, as a means of investigating the full nature and source of an unknown natural threat. 
Information on the functioning of ecosystems, collected by environmental impact assessments 
and consequent monitoring, can be employed for this purpose, and also for structuring an 
adequate and up-to-date emergency preparedness plan. Data produced through the observation 
of ecosystem reactions to environmental policies can be used during the emergency response 
phase, in order to avoid allowing decision makers to opt for policy solutions that might 
weaken ecosystem resilience during rebuilding and recovery.  
The circle of risk management can be put to work for the benefit of the principle of 
resilience even when adaptive management is not yet adopted by environmental agencies. 
This is so because the occurrence of a hazardous event can highlight to the public errors in 
management that have resulted in greater vulnerability to catastrophes. When a failure in 
management is noticed, decision makers are more likely to emphasize learning and to support 
a change in polices and methods than when the policy applied seems to be working 
perfectly206. Under those circumstances, the adaptive management procedure has higher 
chances of being accepted and adopted if it is proposed during the recovery phase of the circle 
of risk management because there will be greater political will to implement innovative 
solutions.  
The perception of risk influences the political will to adopt adaptive management. 
However, that is not the sole factor that influences decision making regarding risks. 
Governments are also subjected to procedures and directives guiding which measures and 
regulations can and cannot be taken to address certain risks. The influence of governmental 
governance on the adoption of adaptive management will be analyzed in the following 
section, dedicated to adaptive governance.  
 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
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Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is a procedure for “evaluating the likely 
impact of a proposed activity on the environment”207 prior to the commencement of a project. 
This procedure is aimed at providing the necessary knowledge to decision-makers to prevent 
environmental harm before it occurs208. Although the EIA aids informed decision making by 
identifying the environmental risks of an activity, it does not determine whether a project 
should proceed and how it should be regulated; such decisions are assigned to public 
authorities, who will balance the information provided by the EIA with other national or 
regional concerns209. The duty to promote an EIA is essentially procedural because public 
authorities’ decision is not bound by the findings of the EIA210.   
 The EIA contributes to the implementation of national policies on sustainable 
development and precautionary action. The EIA procedure provides information on 
environmental risks to the public and offers the opportunity for public participation in 
decision-making regarding environmental issues211. 
Both in the international and in the national sphere, the EIA provides governments 
with the information needed to evaluate whether the benefits of an activity exceed the 
activity’s negative consequences to the environment. Depending on the result of this 
balancing process, the activity may be enjoined, restricted, or otherwise regulated in order to 
oblige the proponent to: change the initial project, mitigate the expected impacts or pay for 
the environmental costs his activity will cause society. 
The strongest and most comprehensive elaboration of the states’ duty to promote 
environmental impact assessment is stated in Rio Declaration Principle 17: 
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Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be undertaken for proposed activities 
that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a 
competent national authority.  
 However, this was not the only international document that required the elaboration of 
EIA: it is required under other non-binding instruments212. The EIA is also required under 
several binding international conventions213. The EIA is required by multilateral financial 
institutions214 and the government’s duty to elaborate the EIA has been referenced in 
international judicial decisions215. The EIA procedure is also considered an obligation 
imposed by the “do no-harm” or “good neighborliness” general principle of International Law 
to the State that is proposing an activity that can cause transboundary environmental harm216.  
 The duty to promote environmental impact assessment is so well established in 
international environmental law that it can be regarded as a general principle of law or even a 
requirement of customary law217.  
 The great majority of countries in the world have adopted the EIA as mandatory 
regulations or, at least, informal guidelines218. The elaboration of EIAs is usually a 
prerequisite governments require from project proponents before granting them permits 
necessary for the initiation of project. 
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EIA Procedure beneficial characteristics  
 
Although the principle of resilience is essentially substantive, this article proposes that 
the principle has a procedural facet, in order to facilitate implementation. The application of 
the principle of resilience to the EIA procedure can comply with this need.  
As EIA obliges the consideration of environmental issues prior to every project that 
can cause significant environmental harm, it is an important tool to include concerns 
regarding ecosystem resilience in activities that incidentally affect and are affected by the 
environment, but that are not directly focused on environmental management.  
The introduction of the principle of resilience in EIA procedure recognizes the State’s 
duty to identify the factors that put ecosystem resilience at risk and to address such factors in 
a way that creates greater resilience. In this duty is implicit the idea, also present in many 
international agreements, that States should seek to enhance environmental quality (not only 
to mitigate impacts). Also, a natural and procedural consequence of such a duty is that 
government officials should receive training in identifying human activities and natural 
phenomena that may impact ecosystem resilience.  
Since everybody has the right to use natural resources in a way that does not impair 
the perpetuation of ecosystem features, the EIA has an important role in predicting and 
preventing such impairment. Also, once a proposed activity could harm the environment 
solely by increasing the vulnerability of the ecosystem to disturbances, it is a logical 
conclusion that the assessment of ecosystem vulnerability and, therefore, ecosystem resilience 
should be included in every EIA. Thus, the inclusion of concerns about improving ecosystem 
resilience in EIA procedures would contribute to the completeness of the environmental 
impact assessment and enhance its capacity to predict and prevent all possible impacts.  
If the EIA identifies an activity that can impair the continuing exercise of an 
ecosystem function and the government authorizes this activity, the implementation of the 
activity can result not only in the collapse of the ecosystem as a whole, but also in the collapse 
of the economic activity itself, which depends on the regular functioning of the ecosystem to 
keep going. Therefore, the introduction of the evaluation of ecosystem resilience in 
environmental impact assessments is important not only to increase EIA’s capacity to prevent 
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environmental harm but also to increment EIA’s value to society, by alerting officials and 
preventing ecological consequences that can result in loss of investments. In order to illustrate 
the kind of losses entrepreneurs can suffer due to ecological consequences of ill-planned 
human activity, it is possible to mention the case of the blueberry growers, Bridges Brothers 
Ltd., who claimed that spraying fenitrothion to control outbreaks of spruce budworm in the 
Canadian forest caused the death of pollinating bees and, consequently, damaged the 
blueberry crop. The loss of the crop over the period of 1970-1971 resulted in an assessed loss 
of $1,331,693.14219.  
The EIA can also stimulate the alteration of the project design in order to increase the 
adoption of patterns of production in synergy with ecosystem function. This goal can be 
achieved by using raw materials naturally provided by the ecosystem where the facility is 
located instead of introducing crops of alien species or importing raw materials from other 
places (disposal of which will introduce alien substances into the ecosystem, potentially 
causing disequilibrium in ecosystem function).  
The fact that every EIA requires a background study of the ecosystem where the 
proposed activity will be located and the study of the impacts the activity can cause on species 
and on ecosystem functions provides environmental agencies a great quantity of information 
on the environmental status of a region and on the activities developed there. This information 
is necessary to assess the resilience of an ecosystem and would be too costly to be produced 
by the government alone. Also, the fact that the generation of such information is mandatory 
is an advantage because it makes this a secure source of information to agencies as it is not 
subject to the lack of funding or other issues that can retard or disable the collection of data by 
public or private research programs. 
The EIA also provides an opportunity for interdisciplinary discussion regarding a 
project during its elaboration and when decision-makers balance the environmental concerns 
presented in the EIA final report with other interests to decide whether a project should be 
implemented.  
 
EIA Procedure limitations and how to address them 
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Foreseeability of the harm 
 
The obligation to do an environmental impact assessment is limited in scope in two 
ways. First, a threshold of foreseeability of harm must be met before the obligation arises. 
Under most treaties, the obligation to do one EIA and to notify states endangered by the 
activity arises only once it is previously known that the harm is likely to occur220. This EIA 
limitation is negative for the implementation of the principle of resilience because most 
harmful consequences of weakened resilience are unpredictable and are noticed only after 
they have already occurred.  
The need for a threshold of foreseeability of an activity’s impacts on ecosystem 
resilience is particularly difficult to achieve due to the existing uncertainty regarding how 
ecosystem functions are distributed among the different species and which kind of disturbance 
would cause the ecosystem to collapse. 
There are some possible solutions to this limitation of the scope of EIA obligation 
regarding the need for a threshold of foreseeability. One is to rely on the precautionary 
principle when interpreting references to the likelihood of harm in Principle 17 of the Rio 
Declaration, in order to lower the threshold of risk required for the EIA obligation to arise. 
One application of such an approach, adopted by the Antarctic Protocol, is to require for all 
activities, except in de minimis cases, an “initial environmental examination” to determine 
whether the expected impact is more than minor221.  
Another solution is to distribute the requirement to assess environmental impacts 
between the prior impact assessment, which we regularly understand by EIA, and the post 
impact assessment, which is referred to as post impact monitoring or just monitoring. The 
prior impact assessment would be responsible for revealing predictable impacts and imposing 
measures to mitigate them, while the post impact assessment would identify and address 
unpredictable impacts and inefficiencies of the mitigation measures proposed by the prior 
assessment.  
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This approach, which is classified as adaptive, recognizes that prior assessment is not 
capable of predicting the totality of impacts and providing certainty222. Monitoring shifts the 
EIA procedure’s priority from prediction and control to adaptability and responsiveness. 
Approaches to operating in chaotic and complex environments that evolve and change in 
parallel with the ecosystem are more likely to be effective in coping with uncertainty223. By 
managing ecosystems for uncertainty, the adaptive approach transforms the EIA procedure 
into an ongoing investigation rather than a one-time prediction of impacts224.  
 Monitoring provides the opportunity to determine the causes of change and whether 
such change is a consequence of the project or of another type of action225.  This procedure 
also assesses a project’s compliance with regulations, agreements or legislation and provides 
agencies with proper information to assess the effects of the project’s mitigation policy in 
order to determine if further action should be taken to prevent environmental harm226. The 
assessment of compliance with legislation coupled with the gathering of information about the 
progress of a particular project increase the transparency and accountability of proponents’ 
mitigation actions, as the procedure assesses whether mitigation actions are actually reducing 
impacts. 
 Monitoring enables managers to identify potential negative trends at an early stage and 
to better understand the complex relationships between human actions, and environmental and 
social systems227. This understanding enables the construction of scientific knowledge about 
how to enhance the ecosystem’s capability to recover rapidly from disturbances.  
The greater transparency and oversight of the results of mitigation actions made 
possible by monitoring increases the likelihood of proportioning environmental improvements 
through human activities. Therefore, monitoring provides a tool for expanding the meaning of 
management beyond the mere mitigation of impacts towards the continuous improvement of 
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environmental quality. The adoption of this broader perspective on management strategies is 
needed if sustainable development is truly a goal of EIA procedure228.  
Therefore, the procedural background of the principle of resilience is enhanced by the 
recognition of the legal obligation to monitor environmental conditions and to employ the 
monitoring procedure to guide actions aimed at creating positive environmental effects by 
human activities.  
In order to provide the tools for environmental improvement, one important part of the 
post-impact analysis is auditing the information obtained through monitoring. While 
monitoring is the observation, measurement and recording of information about specific 
aspects of the project229, auditing is a later stage of the process when accounts and records are 
examined and verified in order to show trends and compare the results to the targets, thereby 
assessing how close the actual situation comes to meeting the situation initially predicted230.  
Auditing is effectively an evaluation of the EIA process: investigating whether or not predicted impacts 
have actually occurred; whether methods used to make these predictions were reliable, whether 
recommendations were followed; and whether safeguards were effective231.  
 
In order to provide an impartial assessment of the environmental quality achieved by a 
project or by a policy, auditing is supposed to be done by a party not involved in the project or 
policy232. 
 In the international sphere, the regulation of monitoring is very limited. It is regulated 
under the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 
(Espoo Convention), which was signed mostly by European countries233. At Article 7, the 
Convention recognizes the close relationship between prior EIA and subsequent monitoring 
but does not mandate the elaboration of monitoring for every likely significant transboundary 
impact. The concerned Parties are supposed to decide, upon request, if a post-project analysis 
will be carried out and under which conditions. 
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The monitoring of the implementation effects of plans and programs is required under 
Article 12 of the Kiev Protocol and article 10 of the European Commission 2001 Directive in 
order ‘to identify at an early stage unforeseen adverse effects, and to be able to undertake 
appropriate remedial action’.  
In summary, European regional law requires monitoring of plans and programs likely 
to cause significant adverse transboundary impact, but it does not require monitoring at the 
project level, except when the concerned countries decide so234. At the international level, the 
obligation to promote monitoring is non-existent. 
  At the national level, statutes requiring the elaboration of a monitoring plan within the 
environmental assessment procedure are present in Canada and Brazil.  
In Brazil, every EIA is required to present a monitoring plan235. However, the 
execution of this plan is much prejudiced because the federal regulation does not provide 
deadlines and penalties for project proponents who do not provide periodic monitoring 
reports.  Besides that, the elaboration of monitoring reports is not a prerequisite for the 
renewal of an environmental license. In addition to the execution of the monitoring plan, the 
environmental agencies can require private entities to provide any kind of information 
regarding the potential or actual environmental impacts of their activities236. Therefore, the 
enforcement of the monitoring plan is left to the discretion of environmental agencies.  As in 
most countries, Brazilian environmental agencies deal with the constant problem of excessive 
work load exercised by reduced personnel, which contributes to the lack of enforcement of 
monitoring provisions.  
Additionally, monitoring in Brazil is also exercised by the government during frequent 
inspections of industrial and commercial facilities by environmental agents to identify 
environmental impacts not covered or predicted by the project’s environmental license237. 
Therefore, the monitoring is usually limited to the assessment of compliance with permits and 
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legislation. If environmental agencies learn of supervening grave risks to the environment or 
to human health238 caused by the project, they are able to modify or cancel the environmental 
license.  
The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act assigns to the environmental agencies 
the obligation to design and ensure the implementation of a follow-up program when a project 
is required to promote mitigation measures239. When a project is not likely to cause significant 
impact, the agency has discretion to decide whether a follow-up program is appropriate240. 
Follow-up requirements rarely are determined until after project approval is granted with the 
result that little attention is paid to specific arrangements for follow-up in the assessment or 
the EIS241. 
In the United States, there is no obligation to monitor impacts at the federal level 
within the EIA procedure. Monitoring is utilized to assess compliance with permits and 
legislation, especially regarding the presence of contaminants in water and air242. Monitoring 
elaborated under an ecosystem approach is applied to National Parks243 and to projects of 
restoration of wetlands244. The policy of wetlands mitigation banking allows developers to 
compensate for wetlands that will be destroyed through development by ensuring the 
restoration of wetlands in another location245. The monitoring is used to verify whether the 
restoration actually occurred in order to permit the compensation. 
EIA effectiveness reviews demonstrate that monitoring is more the exception than the 
rule. The same can be said about accurate forecasts and the use of confidence limits (as a 
means of acknowledging uncertainties)246. 
  
Significant impact on the environment 
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The second limitation on EIA scope refers to the fact that the procedure is solely 
applied to activities that will probably have a significant impact on the environment. 
Therefore, the procedure is not required for activities whose impact is deemed small or 
transitory247.  
Ecosystem resilience can be threatened by activities that generate irrelevant impacts if 
considered separately, but that are capable of weakening ecosystem resilience if considered 
collectively. The process of loss of resilience is cumulative because the inability to replenish 
coping resources propels a region and its people to increasing criticality248. If the 
environmental evaluation scheme relies only on project-based environmental impact 
assessment, the detection of impoverishment of resilience can be seriously affected. That is 
why it is important to treat ecosystem resilience both as a direct and indirect impact on 
activities.  
The evaluation of indirect impacts is not exempt from the EIA procedure. Direct 
impacts on the physical environment, as well as indirect impacts arising from other types of 
induced activity, the interrelatedness of environmental impacts and cumulative impacts need 
to be assessed249.  
However, due to their nature, indirect impacts are better detected through the use of 
differentiated methods able to link EIA to related projects and activities, such as legislative 
proposals, policies, programs and plans. According to Lawrence, such a link can be 
established through the elaboration of SEAs (strategic environmental assessment), the 
grouping activities over space, the integration of EIA with sectorial and spatial policies, area 
wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries250.  
This article supports all the actions proposed by Lawrence to link EIA with related 
activities in order to facilitate the detection of indirect impacts, except the “grouping activities 
over space” technique, understood as the method to place together similar activities due to the 
similarity of their impacts. This technique seeks to easily detect indirect impacts of an activity 
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and to reduce the uncertainty of predictions by excluding the occurrence of different impacts 
that may interact in unpredictable ways. The compromise to ecosystem resilience requires the 
repudiation of this idea because this technique increases the intensity of a single kind of 
impact, whose adverse effects will repeatedly concentrate on the same ecosystem function. It 
is expected that if a certain ecosystem function is too frequently and intensely impacted by 
human activities, this function is likely to collapse, which can cause the entire system to 
collapse. On the other hand, if the ecosystem suffers impacts of lower intensity affecting 
different functions, the ecosystem is more likely to recover from such impacts and be more 
resilient. Therefore, instead of grouping similar activities in the same places, ecosystem 
managers should diversify the activities’ zoning. 
The link of EIA procedure with strategic environmental assessment, sectorial and 
spatial policies, area wide assessments and EIA systems based on natural boundaries is an 
important means of enhancing the capacity for adaptive management, and therefore, for the 
enhancement of ecosystem resilience, because it provides the opportunity to cross-analyze the 
information gathered by these mechanisms of data collection. 
Strategic environmental assessment is the process by which environmental 
considerations are required to be fully integrated into the preparation of governmental plans 
and programmes potentially harmful to the environment before their final adoption251. 
Because SEA is done prior to the elaboration of the overall policy, it is undertaken much 
earlier in the decision-making process than environmental impact assessment, which is done 
at the project level252.  
Although the Espoo Convention does not explicitly require the application of SEA 
procedure, it does require the Parties to undertake EIA at the project level and to apply EIA 
principles to policies, plans and programs253. In 2001, the European Commission adopted a 
Directive on SEA, according to which the strategic environmental assessment is to be 
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undertaken ‘during the preparation of a plan or programme and before its adoption or 
submission to the legislative procedure’254.  
The EIA system can also link to corporate environmental management systems255 
(EMS). An Environmental Management System (EMS) is a set of processes and practices that 
enable an organization to reduce its environmental impacts and increase its operating 
efficiency256. EMS’s benefits involve increased ability to differentiate the impacts of specific 
industries and individual producers in a region and the capacity to measure environmental 
performance and impacts and to target responses257.  
The elaboration of EMSs usually occurs due to the free choice of industries 
encouraged by the reduction of costs and the increase of efficiency and control over 
environmental impacts. However, governments can stimulate industries to adopt EMS by 
providing additional benefits, by leading by example with the development of EMS in 
agencies and departments, or by requiring EMS in legislation. The strategy of leading by 
example was adopted by Australia, where the procedure was adopted by the Australian 
Agency for International Development; by Canada, where the Canadian Ministry of the 
Environment is encouraging departments to adopt EMS; and by the United States, which will 
require federal agencies to adopt EMS258.  
 
Case study: spruce budworm 
 
 The case of the management of the spruce budworm in Canada was abundantly 
analyzed in the specialized literature259. The analysis promoted by this article will focus on 
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how the principle of resilience and, more specifically, the recommendations addressed in this 
section would apply to this case.  
 The spruce budworm is a defoliating insect that attack trees of the boreal forests in 
North America. The insect is constantly present in the forest in reduced numbers, except 
during periodic outbreaks as a consequence of these outbreaks, a large portion of the mature 
forest can die, causing an impact on the forest industry, which is the major economic activity 
of great part of the area covered by the forest260. The tree species preferred by the budworm is 
the same species preferred by the pulp industry: the balsam fir261. Therefore, the budworm 
case represents a situation of direct competition between the insect and human activity. 
The budworm outbreak is a natural event that contributes to forest renewal and 
maintenance of species diversity. It has been occurring in the region over the last centuries 
without great disturbance to humans until 1930, when the pulp industry found it had to 
compete with the budworm for fiber262. 
 An historical overview of the management of forests in Canada shows that since 
colonization there was a trend to harvest a specific species of tree at each time, thereby 
changing the composition of the forest: from the late 1700s to mid-1800s there was high 
grading extraction of eastern white pine for ship masts; from the mid-1800s to early 1900s 
there was high grading extraction of large red spruce; and from colonial times to nowadays, 
the forest came to present low abundance of eastern hemlock, which was originally very 
abundant.  This factor is relevant because each species presents a different vulnerability to the 
spruce budworm. The eastern hemlock, for example, only experiences spruce budworm 
damage in very rare cases. On the other hand, the balsam fir and the Dougles fir are the 
favorite targets of the insect263. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the original setting of 
the forest was more resistant to the insect, because the higher concentration of less vulnerable 
trees probably created a barrier to the physical dispersion of the insect. 
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 Since the 1920’s several authors have recommended the utilization of silvicultural 
practices to fight the recently frequent budworm outbreaks264. However, until 1995 
knowledge of the effectiveness of silvicultural control was still deemed “fragmented” and the 
method was never tried as a means to address the spruce budworm outbreaks265. On the other 
hand, the tactic of spraying insecticides, employed since 1951266, was not abandoned even 
when fenitrothion, the substance used until 1998, was proved to cause human health 
problems267 and a great mortality of songbirds268 and bees269.  
Thus, it is possible to conclude that, first, when the spraying was first adopted, the 
knowledge about the technique was not yet complete and the collateral effects of the 
substance employed by the management plan were not predicted. Therefore, if the managers 
had no complete understanding neither of silvicultural measures nor of spraying, why did they 
adopt the latter, which carried a greater risk of environmental impacts in case of failure? 
Governmental protection of the pulp industry may explain such fact. 
In fighting the budworm, the forest management plan and the pulp industry were 
seeking a “definitive” solution which could provide certainty for the economic activity. 
Besides that, the solution should provide the pulp industry the possibility to expand its 
forestry activities, which could not be provided by silvicultural techniques. That is why 
managers opted for the most aggressive option, spraying, neglecting silvicultural 
management, which was deemed an uncertain solution.  
The use of spraying became such a tradition in forest management for fighting the 
budworm that the possibility of not using insecticides became non-existent. This situation can 
be seen in the “Environmental impact assessment of experimental spruce budworm adulticide 
trials”. When discussing the effects of phosphamidon, the insecticide employed by the 
Program, on forest avifauna, the EIA simply compared the results of this insecticide with 
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those produced by other kind of chemicals, the larvicides. The EIA analysis is exhausted by 
showing that phosphamidon is the chemical less harmful to birds270. However, the EIA does 
not discuss the alternative of not using chemicals at all.  
The adopted management plan, which was supposed to provide certainty, inevitably 
created unpredictable impacts, such as: the spread of outbreaks to areas previously not 
affected by the budworm because spraying expelled the survivor insects to the neighborhoods; 
dependence of the forest on the insecticide; and the risk of even greater outbreaks due to the 
increasing resilience of the budworm. It is possible to infer that this policy created a perverse 
final result which increased the resilience of the parasite and diminished the resilience of the 
forest. 
The analysis of the budworm case through the perspective of the principle of resilience 
shows a sequence of management mistakes. First, the environmentally less aggressive option 
to address a management issue cannot be excluded from the environmental impact 
assessment. EIA provides decision makers with information about the alternatives to a 
management issue. If the less aggressive option is not assessed, decision makers hardly will 
be able to adequately weigh that option against the others available.  
Second, decision makers must be guided by the principle of resilience to prioritize the 
environmentally less aggressive option of management. The priority can be set by imposing 
on the decision makers the obligation to publicly justify why a more aggressive management 
option is preferred to the less aggressive one. However, it is possible to notice that if this way 
of establishing the priority had been adopted in the case of the budworm, decision makers 
would simply state that the silvicultural technique was not yet sufficiently developed to be 
adopted. In this case, the imposition of another obligation on the decision makers would be 
recommended: if a less aggressive management option is not adopted as the main measure to 
address the problem, the technique should be employed in a limited area in order to test if the 
reason why this solution was neglected is observed in reality. The employment of monitoring 
would be essential to implement this recommendation. 
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Third, the ambition for greater profits from an economic activity that is already under 
way cannot be pursued to the detriment of the ecosystem where the economic activity is 
located. Every government and economic actor must internalize the idea that the capacity for 
growth of a certain activity is limited by the ecosystem’s capacity to support this activity. In 
the budworm case, the pulp industry pushed the forest beyond its capacity to support the 
forestry activity. That is why the industry rejected the silvicultural techniques, which would 
have increased the concentration of tree species that are important for the health of the forest, 
but that are not interesting for the pulp industry. The industry wanted to keep the high 
concentrations of balsam fir and Douglas fir, which was the closest they could get to a 
monoculture for pulp extraction. 
Forth, under the principle of resilience, managers are required to analyze the long-term 
effects of their decisions, in order to protect the interests of future generations and of nature 
itself, which can be understood as the preservation of the ecosystem capacity to reorganize 
and maintain itself. This precept was not followed in the case of the budworm: 
The budworm analysis explicitly focuses on a time horizon determined by the slowest variable in the 
system, i.e., tree regeneration and growth. It does not consider long-term evolutionary changes that can 
trigger competitive shifts in tree species composition. Similarly, short-term benefits of a management 
policy might be followed later by unanticipated surprises that, being unanticipated, become crises271. 
 
In order to enable decision makers to predict and to weigh the long-term effects of a 
decision, this article recommends the use of monitoring techniques because long-term effects 
are hardly assessed by prior environmental impact assessment. Therefore, the commitment to 
the preservation of nature and to future generations’ interests requires constant assessment of 
the results obtained by management policies associated with adaptive management 
techniques.  
 
Land use and climate change adaptation  
 
 Land use and zoning regulations are usually created by local or regional governments. 
The zoning plan analyzes the existing land uses and determines community development 
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directions by establishing: different zone district categories, each one with different 
specifications regarding the range of permitted uses, densities of constructions, and structural 
characteristics; an official zone map which maps out the districts on the ground; and a zone 
enforcement agency which interprets and applies the zone requirements272. Through land use 
and zoning regulations, local governments prohibit certain uses within certain areas273, 
thereby imposing limits on the use of property. 
 Land can be destined for economic uses (such as commercial, industrial, agricultural 
and pastures), residential, recreational, conservational. Land use exercises a great influence on 
how resources are managed because it determines or influences: the location of facilities, 
residences and natural lands; the size of tracts of developed land; the amount of land 
conversion; the distances between facilities and the dependence on means of transport. In 
other words, land use regulation can influence production and consumption patterns. That is 
why land use is intimately related to sustainable development. 
 By heavily influencing production and consumption patterns, land use regulations 
greatly influence ecological resilience. Additionally, land use can contribute to the 
conservation of biodiversity everywhere, in its original habitat. Also, as mentioned previously 
(Adaptive Management section) ill land use planning can exacerbate the risk of disaster by 
concentrating population in risk-prone areas and by failing to keep green infrastructure274.  
The principle of resilience requires that land use regulations must prioritize ecological 
resilience and safety, even if it limits economic growth in certain circumstances. This 
application of the principle might appear to undermine the economy; rather, it is only going 
against the short-term pursuit of profits. In reality, this measure provides a deeper 
understanding of economy, as it is necessary for keeping the existence of natural resources in 
the long-term, and for protecting society from disasters to which humankind has given cause 
through centuries of mismanagement of natural resources. By these means, it is expected that 
the principle of resilience will, in fact, benefit the economy in the long-term, by preserving 
the resources and the people it depends on. 
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There are some policy measures, to be explained below, that can use land use as a tool 
for implementing the principle of resilience by strengthening ecological resilience and disaster 
preparedness. 
 
Transferable development rights in coastal areas 
 
 Recently, zoning regulations concerned with environmental protection in the United 
States have been adopting the concept of transferable development rights (TDRs). TDRs 
consist in unused development density at one site being transferred and sold to other sites that 
wish to build beyond standard regulatory limits275. 
TDR programs aim to direct development away from environmentally sensitive land to land more 
suitable for development by creating a market for development rights. Logistically, TDR programs 
achieve this result by quantifying the development potential of sensitive properties ("sending sites"), 
and providing that this development potential may be sold to landowners to increase building density in 
areas suitable for development ("receiving sites")276.  
 
 The transferable development rights create the advantage of avoiding the frequent 
windfalls and wipeouts from land use regulation that both bar development in some places 
and allow it in others. “TDRs promote sharing of the benefits generated and burdens imposed 
by development restrictions. The restrictions make the TDRs more valuable both by reducing 
harmful spillover effects and by requiring those with property eligible for development to 
purchase development rights from other landowners”277.  
 In other words, transferable development rights seek to attenuate the harmful effects of 
land use regulation. Nonetheless, the concept has been continuously criticized. Some argue 
that, even though the TDRs provide economic value to the land targeted by the regulation, 
such value does not compensate the landowner for loss of personal use of the property and 
ends up by disappointing significant investment-backed expectations278. 
In American law, regulatory restrictions on the use of land maintain that it may be 
considered an unlawful taking if the land’s economic value is totally wiped out by the 
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regulation. Even the distribution of TDRs has not prevented the filing of suits claiming 
takings. Litigants seeking to impair such land use regulations go to courts on the grounds that 
“although the positive economic value of TDRs mitigates the ‘economic impact’ of a 
restriction on land use, such value is relevant only to the question of whether a landowner has 
received ‘just compensation’ for ‘taken’ property”279. In summary, according to such critics, 
the distribution of TDRs does not mean that there has been no taking in the first place.  
On the other hand, zone enforcement agencies argue that transferable development 
rights, instead of eliminating land property rights, are indeed reinforcing them. The zoning 
rules enhance the property rights of all landowners in the area covered by the zoning plan 
because those rules seek to preserve the characteristics that make the region attractive for 
development. In Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency280 a zoning plan was set in place 
to harmonize the protection of the Lake Tahoe basin and the development of the region. When 
defending the building restriction on a piece of land especially important to the maintenance 
of ecosystem functions, the local agency argued that the restricted property would be worth 
even less if the restriction and the TDR mechanism were not in place, because the 
environmental quality and the scenic beauty of the region as a whole would be degraded.   
Transferable development rights have been maintained by the American courts, which 
have been considering that, if the land still has any economic value, it follows that it has not 
suffered a regulatory taking281.  
Transferable development rights constitute a good mechanism to organize sustainable 
development by steering development into parcels that are most environmentally suitable and 
economically profitable and by sharing the economic benefits and burdens of environmental 
restrictions more equitably among all landowners within a certain region. 
This mechanism might also be applied to another situation that tends to be 
increasingly common: the loss of land to the sea. A few cases of coastal line change by 
hurricanes and loss of land property to the sea have been brought to American courts and the 
rule applied is that the owner alone bears the loss of land to the sea. In Severance v. 
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Patterson282, a hurricane had changed the beach shoreline, submerging the public easement 
area protected by the Open Beaches Act, the state regulation that prohibits private property of 
tidal lands so as to assure public access to Texan beaches. The Court decided that landowners 
of coastal properties must assume the risk of losing their land to the sea and must be 
conscious of the obligation to maintain the public easement covering the area between the 
property and the wet beach. In that particular case, the landowner had her property reduced in 
order to allow public access. The conclusion is that the public trust doctrine is more adaptable 
to the changing location of the coast than to property rights because the first is dynamic, being 
determined by the flexible water boundaries, and the second is static, being determined by 
stable public records.  
It is clear that coastal properties need to receive a more flexible legal treatment; 
otherwise it is possible that land owners of entire cities could be totally deprived of their land 
property rights for short periods of time. This kind of consequence would generate very 
disadvantageous results: first, it would threaten legal security, because the assurance of safe 
property rights is one of the most important functions of modern legal regimes; second, it 
would also threaten environmental quality, because it is commonly agreed that environmental 
protection requires strong property rights. The sudden loss of properties in coastal areas may 
result in disorganized occupation of country side areas with no respect for environmentally 
protected areas or for zoning restrictions.  
That is why governments should seek to relax property rights in coastal areas through 
the application of the transferable development rights regime to coastal properties. Therefore, 
if the sea covers part of the property, the landowner would be entitled to the right to develop 
another place. In this case, there would be no claim of takings because it would give to 
landowners a right they did not previously have. This solution might increase the offer of 
development rights, which, in turn, would reduce the value of such rights. However, this 
effect can be corrected by strengthening the zoning regulations in all places (and not only in 
coastal cities) so the new restrictions would function as the creation of a market for 
development rights. 
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Rise of the sea and reallocation of coastal ecosystems 
 
In the context of climate change, land use and zoning may be used to ensure that 
coastal ecosystems will have enough space to restore themselves in the new coastal lines that 
are going to be defined by the rise in sea level. 
The rise of the sea will require coastal ecosystems to readapt to the new ecosystem 
features and to change their location to other places with similar ecological conditions. In 
order to strengthen the resilience of such ecosystems, it would be necessary to carry out in-
depth studies regarding the current and previous features of coastal ecosystems in order to 
maintain records of how they are organized now. These records will be essential to guide 
human efforts to contribute towards the reconstruction of such ecosystems in other places and 
to verify that the future coastal ecosystems keep the same functions currently developed by 
the present coastal ecosystems. Studies should also take into account the ecological features 
and natural history evidence in order to identify where the new coastal lines are expected to 
be and where the new coastal ecosystems are more likely to form. Based on that information, 
governments should restrict the use of land where ecosystems are expected to form, because, 
if such places are completely watertight or otherwise unavailable to receive fauna and flora, 
their coastal ecosystems will be fated to extinction. Those restrictions in use may be achieved 
by the distribution of TDRs when possible, or through expropriation, when the restrictions 
would totally abolish the economic value of the property. 
 
Conservation easements 
 
 Conservation easement is “a legally binding agreement that restricts the development and 
future use of the land to ensure protection of its conservation values”283.  Through conservation 
easement, the landowner voluntarily removes from his property right certain elements, generally rights 
to develop and mine284.  The conservation easement can be sold or donated to the government or to a 
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non-profit organization, which thereby will acquire a non-possessory interest in the protection of 
natural or historic values of the property285.  The easement can be created to last a limited or unlimited 
period of time, during which affirmative obligations attached to the real property are enforced over the 
grantor and his successors by the holder of the easement286. If the holder fails to enforce the easement 
related obligations, they can be enforced by a third party indicated in the easement instrument or by 
the attorney general287.  The holder of the easement is responsible for undertaking long-term 
monitoring of the easement and stewardship of the property288. 
 In the early 1980s, the Congress of the United States enacted tax subsidies for conservation 
easement donations, which resulted in an increase in the number of such agreements289.  However, this 
measure also contributed to the concentration of conservation easements in more affluent regions, 
where wealthy donors could take maximum advantage of tax incentives. Conservation easements are 
currently viewed as a tool for environmental protection, concurring with regulation and public land 
acquisition.  Conservation easements present a lower cost than public land acquisition in the short-
term; however, they might be considered more expensive in the long-term due to expenses with 
monitoring, enforcement, and defense290.  
 Due to climate change, conservation easements might acquire new uses, as an alternative to 
TDRs for preserving areas that are expected to be the new coastal lines during the rise in sea level. 
This tool would be efficient both to maintain private properties in areas that will not be lost to the sea 
and to protect coastal ecosystems’ resilience by keeping undeveloped areas that are expected to 
acquire an essential ecological role in preventing the extinction of coastal ecosystems during the next 
decades.  
 
“Reserva florestal legal” 
 
In 1965, the Brazilian federal government enacted the country’s Forest Code, which 
obliges every rural property to reserve a parcel of the land, which may range from 20 to 80 
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percent of the property, for the protection of the original flora291. The land protected under 
this rule is called reserva florestal legal.  
Reserva legal was created to promote the sustainable use of natural resources; the 
conservation and regeneration of ecological processes; and the conservation of biodiversity, 
by preserving the native flora that shelters native fauna292.  
The localization of reserva legal within the rural property is determined by the 
landowner and must be approved by the environmental agency at the landowner’s request. 
Once the localization is established and the reserva legal is registered, it imposes perpetual 
conservation obligations on the landowner and his successors.  
Reserva legal is an administrative limitation imposed on the use of private property293. 
This obligation intends to shape the rural private property in order to ensure that it 
accomplishes its social function294. According to the Brazilian Constitution, every private 
property must fulfill its social function295, which requirements are established by the 
Constitution. As for rural property, the constitutional requirements are the following: rational 
and adequate enjoyment of the land; adequate employment of available natural resources and 
environmental protection; compliance with labor laws; exploitation in such a way as to ensure 
the welfare of owners and employers296. 
If the landowner fails to use the land in such a way as to accomplish its social 
function, the government can expropriate the property, by compensating the owner. This 
penalty, however, has not been applied to rural properties in non-compliance with 
environmental laws. In fact, for several decades, since the establishment of the obligation to 
create reserva legal, there was no concrete penalty for a landowner’s failure to register this 
protected land. This situation was changed in 2008, when the federal government established 
daily monetary fines for every rural property that fails to register its reserva legal297.  
                                                           
 
291
 CÓDIGO FLORESTAL [C. FLOR.] [FOREST CODE], Law n. 4771/1965, art. 1, § 2, III (Braz.). 
292
 Id. 
293
 ÉDIS MILARÉ, DIREITO DO AMBIENTE 753, (2009) 
294
 JOSÉ DOS SANTOS CARVALHO FILHO, MANUAL DE DIREITO ADMINISTRATIVO 754, (22nd ed., 2009) 
295
 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art.5, XXIII (Braz.). 
296
 C.F., art. 186. 
297
 Decree 6514/2008, art. 55 (Braz.). 
90 
 
 
©2011 Lia Helena Demange 
The regulation caused strong public debates between farmers and environmentalists 
because the farmers believe that the government is attributing to them an excessive share of 
the burdens of environmental protection. In part due to these debates, proposals for reform of 
the Brazilian Forest Code are currently being analyzed by the Brazilian Congress. Rural 
landowners are pressing the government to reduce the percentages of land the law requires to 
be registered as reserva legal and to expand the range of land uses at the reserva legal 
allowed by the law. Environmentalists have been calling on the government representatives to 
apply the non-regression principle in order to prevent the reduction of environmental 
protection around the country. 
Currently, Brazilian law holds the landowner responsible for maintaining the forest in 
reserva legal by planting native trees when necessary according to the legal requirements and 
the guidance provided by the federal environmental agency298. The landowner is allowed to 
promote sustainable use of the forest preserved as reserva legal, as long as his Plan of Use is 
approved by the environmental agency299. The landowner can exploit resources taken from 
the trees and even cut down selected trees, by promoting silvicultural studies and reforestation 
efforts in order to keep the main characteristics of the flora300. Besides the right to sustainably 
use the forest resources, the landowner is also entitled to total exemption from federal tax 
related to the reserva legal area301.  
Reserva legal has some similarities with conservation easements, because both 
policies promote environmental conservation on private properties; provide tax benefits to the 
landowners; and impose obligations that are attached to the real property and enforceable on 
the current land owner and his successors. 
Unlike the conservation easement, the establishment of reserva legal is mandatory, 
which prevents the downside of having environmental conservation concentrated in wealthier 
areas. For this reason, this might be a better solution for environmental policies in developing 
countries. On the other hand, reserva legal is less adaptable than conservation easements to 
the circumstances of the case because there is no voluntary agreement by which the owner can 
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choose the rights of property he is weaving through the conservation easement. Also, in 
mandatory for all rural properties, reserva legal is more able to ensure the conservation of 
biodiversity everywhere. 
 
Restrictions on farming methods 
 
 Currently agriculture alone is responsible for 85% of water consumption, covers 35 to 
40% of world land and accounts for 30% of global greenhouse gases emission302. These 
resources are mostly used to grow food for the world’s population, which is an essential 
economic activity that cannot be impaired. However, in many cases, crops are cultivated in 
non-sustainable ways, greatly contributing to the rapid depletion of water and soil around the 
world303. Therefore, it is expected that better management of the use of natural resources by 
agriculture can generate a meaningful reduction of the consumption of resources and of 
environmental impacts at the same rate as improvements in the provision of ecological 
services. 
 New methods of sustainable agriculture have been developed in order to enhance soil 
nutrient cycling and reduce the need for fertilizers and pesticides. 
 Recent studies have pointed to permaculture as a very successful sustainable method 
of cultivating the soil. This method tries to recreate the functional diversity of ecosystems by 
using stored rainwater to support the growth of multiple functional groups of species – such as 
atmospheric nitrogen absorption, soil fixation, and shadow – in order to create an indefinitely 
self-sustained agriculture304. That is why the method’s name derives from “permanent 
agriculture”. This method reduces aridity; soil impoverishment by erosion; salinity and 
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acidification305.  Indeed, mixing crops has been achieving very successful results in pushing 
back the desert and increasing per capita food production in African countries along the 
Sahara’s edge, such as Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Kenya306. Similarly good 
results were observed in Jordan307. In Honduras, sustainable agriculture developed through the 
employment of traditional knowledge reduced the impacts of hurricanes in the Quezungal 
region308. 
 Permaculture and other sustainable agriculture initiatives could be encouraged through 
governmental regulation of land use or incentives such as tax deductions in order to reduce 
environmental impacts and improve the provision of ecosystems services within agriculture. 
Adaptive management initiatives could implement these sustainable agriculture techniques in 
pilot-projects to test which of them are more adequate for certain regions. The success of 
these initiatives can also work as a showcase to encourage nearby farmers to adopt them.  
Local land use or other natural resource management regulations can prohibit crops 
that are totally inadequate to local ecosystems, such as lettuce and alfalfa - high water 
demanding crops – in deserts309. For example, in the United States, states that apply the prior 
appropriation doctrine for water uses310 could push for more sustainable uses of water in 
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agriculture by enacting regulatory provisions that classify as non-beneficial the use of water to 
irrigate crops that are inappropriate to the local climate311.  
 
“Global zoning” 
 
  The idea of “global zoning” for agriculture was based on a proposal suggested by 
Jonathan Foley312. When discussing solutions to feed a growing population with limited and 
already over-exploited natural resources, Foley suggested focusing on existing fields to select 
places where the production of each crop is more prolific and to verify in which other place 
around the globe the same kind of climate and soil is found. By comparing such physically 
similar places, it is possible to verify where land management is deterring food production. 
With such data in hand, an international organization such as FAO could create “global 
zoning” to assess which crop has greater potential in each region. By these means, it would be 
possible to assess which parties from which parts of the world would benefit most from 
partnerships among government’s agencies and/or economic actors for interchange of 
management experiences. As noticed by Foley, this method presents the risk of encouraging 
the expansion of monocultures, which is a result that totally goes against the idea of 
sustainable agriculture. In order to prevent such a risk, the international organization should 
focus its assessment on the most effective combination of certain climate and soil and a 
certain mix of crops (instead of individual crops). 
 
Market mechanisms for conserving ecosystem services 
 
 The payment for ecosystem services is a manner of both valuing and preserving the 
benefits ecosystems generate to humans. It is a tradeoff where the user of the ecosystem 
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service pays the value of the service to the owner of the natural capital that provides the 
service. The payment for ecosystem services stimulates the owner of the natural capital to 
preserve the natural mechanism thereby generating an economic activity guided towards 
preservation and designed to compete with the economic activities that would result in the 
destruction of the natural capital. 
Payment for ecosystem services is mainly based on the traditional market theory and 
on Hardin’s Tragedy of the Commons313. The market theory relies on the following 
assumptions: economic actors are rational and selfish and the demand for resources is 
determined by the price, not by the finitude of resources. A market for ecosystem services 
must provide benefits that exceed the costs of trade, that is, informational and transaction 
costs. Besides that, as investments tend to go where they can generate more income, payment 
for ecosystem services should be greater than the profits that would be received by the owner 
of the natural capital if he were to develop the land.  
From an economic perspective, ecosystem services present the following 
characteristics: they are positive externalities, in the sense that their effects cross the 
boundaries of the land where the natural capital is located to benefit the economic actors 
located in the proximate area; it is difficult to exclude a user’s access to the services and, by 
this reason, such services are very susceptible to free riders (term used to designate the person 
who enjoys an economic benefit without having to pay for it); ecosystem services are not 
usually traded in the market and, for that reason, their price has to be determined by 
mechanisms that mimic the market (such as the mechanisms employed in cost-benefit 
analysis to measure the benefits of protecting the environment). 
Garrett Hardin has put light on the application of the market theory to environmental 
protection in the Tragedy of the Commons314. Hardin’s model describes the common 
                                                           
 
313
 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  
314
 Id. The Tragedy of the Commons illustrates the issues that may arise from the private use of jointly owned 
resources. Hardin gives the example of a common field used by multiple owners to feed their cattle. One owner 
notes that if he or she increases the number of animals, he or she will be able to yield more profit while 
maintaining the same costs. In this case, the “costs” are the weight loss of each animal. The additional animals 
included in the herd will eat the grass that was being eaten solely by the primary animals. It means that each 
additional animal introduced will cause a reduction in the weight of its companions. Thereby, the profit earned 
by the owner that increased his or her herd is supported by the weight loss of the animals belonging to other 
owners. That is how the cost of somebody’s profit is externalized to others. If all owners decide to act in that 
95 
 
 
©2011 Lia Helena Demange 
evolution of events when private benefits are obtained from finite and common resources. 
Unlike the market theory, Hardin’s model assumes the finitude of resources. As the market 
theory, however, Hardin believes that economic actors act in a selfish manner. Hardin’s 
conclusion is that environmental protection is obtained only by two means: private property or 
regulation to internalize externalities. Hardin’s theory is only adequate for explaining the 
results of exploitation of common resources where access cannot be excluded. The main 
criticism of this theory is that it does not account for social norms as an alternative means for 
addressing environmental protection315. 
Following Hardin’s lead, payment for ecosystem services does not consider the 
importance of social norms in addressing environmental protection. On the other hand, the 
principle of resilience recognizes the importance of social norms, especially moral norms, in 
protecting the environment. It is due to this distinction that the principle of resilience will 
establish limits to the application of the payment of ecosystem services as a tool for 
implementing environmental protection. 
The first limitation the principle of resilience creates to the payment for ecosystem 
services refers to private initiatives for creating a market for ecosystem services, which shall 
be called private payment for ecosystem services from now on in this article. Ruhl et al 
exemplify the creation of such a market through private initiative when there are a large 
number of economic actors both on the service users and on the natural capital owners’ sides. 
In this situation, the common pathway would be: a sufficient number of natural capital owners 
need to identify each other, agree to threaten to eliminate the natural capital, evaluate the 
ecosystem service benefits, identify the service users, develop a strategy for negotiating with 
them, and devise a method for allocating any payments received among the group316.  
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Such a pathway towards the payment of ecosystem services raises concern under the 
principle of resilience because it departs from the idea that whoever owns the natural capital 
needs to threaten the ecosystem before receiving payment for maintaining it. If high-lighting 
the threat to the ecosystem element is not sufficient to show the obviously unethical character 
of such a pathway, it might be useful to compare this strategy to one used by a criminal who 
takes someone as a hostage and promises to kill the hostage if he does not receive the money 
he required. The structure of thinking is the same in both situations. One may argue that the 
first situation is not as grave as the second because it refers to plants, animals, and the biotic 
community as a whole, while the second refers to people. Of course this is a valid argument 
and this article does not seek to affirm that people are less or as important as other members 
of the land mechanism - human life is always above other ethical values. Rather, this 
comparison is based on the assumption that both human lives and nature have an inherent 
value and a good of their own317, which means that both are entities deserving of moral 
concern and consideration and, therefore, “all moral agents have a prima facie duty to 
promote or preserve the entity’s good as an end in itself”318.  
The moral obligation to respect every forms of life was already recognized by the 
United Nations General Assembly, that affirmed: “every form of life is unique, warranting 
respect regardless of its worth to man, and, to accord other organisms such recognition, man 
must be guided by a moral code of action”319. 
The theory of private payment for ecosystem services contains several aspects that 
evince lack of respect for nature. Besides threatening nature as a requirement for creating 
markets by private initiative, by attributing a monetary value to the benefits nature brings to 
humankind, the model for commercialization of ecosystem services unavoidably treats nature 
as a product. Studies such as the Stern Report, which calculates the total value of Earth’s 
ecosystem services, might be useful for evincing the importance of nature for economic 
actors. However, this kind of assessment contributes to eroding in people’s minds the idea 
that some things have values that cannot be totally translated into monetary amounts. In other 
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words, treating nature as a product is antithetical to the aim of attributing an inherent value to 
nature and respecting nature. 
Also, private payment for ecosystem services attributes no value to ecosystem services 
that do not benefit humans because they are located far away from human populations320. 
Therefore, the theory shows no consideration for ecological functions that are provided for the 
sole benefit of wild beings. According to Paul Taylor, this attitude demonstrates no respect for 
nature, even if it has the potential to benefit nature in many situations: 
People who have an exclusively human-centered view-point in environmental matters may at times 
perform actions that in fact further the good of wild creatures. But their actions do not express the 
attitude of respect for nature because they are not done for the sake of the wild creatures themselves. 
The underlying aim is to benefit humans, either immediately or in the long run321. 
 
Due to the lack of respect for nature noted as the basis of the theory of private 
payment for ecosystem services, this form of payment should be refrained from all together, 
because the attitude of respect for nature entails being disposed to refrain from certain kinds 
of action because of their inherent qualities or future consequences322. Following Leopold’s 
thinking, aiming for a state of harmony with nature means seeking harmony with the whole 
land mechanism323; one cannot claim to respect nature if one accepts the adoption of legal or 
economical mechanisms that disregard the moral obligations humans must have towards the 
land mechanism. 
Private payment for ecosystem services generates not only moral issues, but also 
ecological issues. By being human-centered, payment for ecosystem services results solely in 
the preservation of ecological functions that are important to humans (not in the protection of 
ecological functions that are important only to the land mechanism)324. Also, payment for 
ecosystem services tends to rely on the minimum parcel of the land mechanism necessary for 
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maintaining the service, therefore focusing on the keystone species that represent the different 
functional groups and guarantee the basic functioning of the ecosystem325. However, the 
maintenance of keystone species cannot ensure the continuity of the ecosystem. In order to 
strengthen the resilience of the ecosystem, it is necessary not only to preserve the keystone 
species, but also the redundant species, because those will be the “insurance capital” which 
guarantees the continuity of that specific function in case one of the keystone species is 
extinct from the ecosystem326. Therefore, payment for maintaining the keystone species can 
erode ecological redundancy and weaken ecosystem resilience. 
Is it possible to create a market for ecosystem services through private initiative that 
does not incur the ethical wrong of threatening nature? The only situation this work envisions 
that would be exempt from this wrong doing would be the case where the user offers to pay 
for the ecosystem services before the owner of the natural capital considers destroying the 
ecosystem to develop the land. This might seem an unusual situation because, due to the 
difficulty in excluding access to natural services, the user probably will be already enjoying 
the service for free before any transaction is made with the owner of the natural capital327. 
Thus, the user hardly would spontaneously offer to pay for something that he takes for 
granted. 
However, although a voluntarily offer to pay for ecosystem services might not be the 
rule, it may occur under certain circumstances. It is the case when the natural capital exists 
but does not generate the ecosystem service due to mismanagement by the owner. In this case, 
the potential user might assess the reason why he is not receiving the service and offer to pay 
for the owner of the natural capital to correct the management problem in order to make the 
provision of ecosystem services possible. This situation occurred in the municipality of 
Extrema, in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais.  
In Extrema, the municipality noticed that the water bodies that supplied water for the 
city presented a decrease in water quality because farmers upstream allowed their cattle to 
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walk in the water bodies, thereby increasing erosion328. In order to improve water quality and 
reduce costs of water treatment in the supply system, the municipality paid the farmers to 
fence off the water bodies that passed through their properties in order to prevent erosion, 
both by blocking the access of cattle and by reforesting the margins of headwaters.  
In another situation, the user of an ecosystem service that is currently being provided 
might also decide to voluntarily offer payment for the service when he notices that the service 
is fundamental to the continuity of his economic activity and that he will be better off paying 
the service and ensuring its continuity rather than taking the risk of losing the service in case 
the owner of the natural capital decides to develop the land.  
Except those situations where the user of the service voluntarily offers to pay for the 
ecosystem service, this article envisions no other means through which the creation of a 
market for ecosystem services by private initiative would not compel the user to enter into a 
contract due to an immoral threat by the owner of natural capital. 
Although payment for ecosystem services raises several reasons for concern, this tool 
has a major benefit that justifies its consideration it as a valid and useful means of promoting 
environmental protection: when implemented, payment for ecosystem services inverts the 
legal and economic trend noticed throughout history to incentivize the development of the 
land and the destruction of ecosystem services329. That is why it is often presented as a useful 
tool for conservation.  
Seeking to promote the benefit generated by the payment for ecosystem services 
without incurring the wrongdoing of threatening nature, this article accepts the employment of 
such a preservation tool in the following cases: when service users voluntarily propose to pay 
for the ecosystem service; or when the trading program is used as a tool to encourage 
compliance with regulations that oblige the preservation of the ecosystem in certain parcels of 
land.  
The first model, which can be called the voluntary payment for ecosystem services, 
does not solve the problem of preserving solely ecosystem functions that are useful to humans 
or of adopting a human-centered perspective that undermines the attitude of respect for 
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nature: these issues can be addressed by applying the voluntary payment for ecosystem 
services in conjunction with the second model - that can be called regulatory payment for 
ecosystem services. The ecosystem-broad regulation of the regulatory payment for ecosystem 
services regulates the preservation of ecological integrity in a determined portion of land, 
therefore adopting a bio-centered perspective that ensures the preservation of every ecological 
function, both those that help the ecosystem to maintain itself, and those that are useful to 
humans.  
Therefore, voluntary payment for ecosystem services can be adopted only when there 
is already in place an ecosystem-broad regulation which, with or without a system of 
regulatory payment for ecosystem services, provides protection to whole ecosystems in a 
minimal area able to guarantee the maintenance of their resilience. In this context, voluntary 
payment for ecosystem services covers additional protection of nature, never being used as a 
single tool to promote environmental protection. The stem of environmental protection and 
preservation of ecosystem resilience must rely on a regulation that requires the preservation of 
all ecosystem functions within a minimum extension of preserved land.  
Another important feature of relying on regulation as the stem of environmental 
protection is that every landowner is presumably obliged to conserve nature while in private 
or voluntary payment for ecosystem services the landowner is presumed to have no such 
obligation. That is why in markets initiated by regulation, the landowner who does not 
preserve is obliged to pay somebody else for it in her name, while in private and voluntary 
markets the landowner who develops the land does not have any obligation while the one who 
preserves receives a payment for it. The first mindset is much more coherent with the 
principle of resilience’s moral premise that everybody should respect and preserve the land 
mechanism. 
The municipality of Extrema, in Brazil, is an example of both voluntary payment for 
ecosystem services and regulatory payment for ecosystem services. That is so because the 
municipality voluntarily offered to pay for the preservation of vegetation around the 
headwaters, which is already required by Brazilian law330. Therefore, Extrema is an example 
of regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation on-site. There is 
                                                           
 
330
 C. FLOR., art. 2, c, & art. 3, §5. 
101 
 
 
©2011 Lia Helena Demange 
also regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating conservation off-site when 
conservation on-site is not recommended, for which it is possible to mention as examples 
wetland banking in the United States and servidão florestal (in English, environmental 
servitude) in Brazil.  
In the United States, filling wetlands requires a prior permit from the Corps of 
Engineers331. The Corps guidelines for giving the so-called 404 permits attend to the 
following order of desirability: the developer should avoid filling wetlands; he should 
minimize the adverse impacts to wetlands that cannot be avoided; and he should provide 
compensatory mitigation for unavoidable impacts. In order to be allowed to fill the wetland, 
the developer must prove that no reasonable alternatives exist to the development of the 
wetlands332. Compensation for the impacts can be implemented on-site or off-site, but off-site 
mitigation banking is preferred over on-site because of the greater efficiency, scale effects, 
and environmental protection333 
The Brazilian restriction on rural private property known as reserva legal (see the 
Land use topic) presents some market mechanisms to relax the legal obligation to preserve 
native forest in every track of rural land. If the property has no native forest, the Brazilian 
Forest Code allows the landowner to buy a new tract of land to establish the reserva legal, or 
to establish it on a third party land, through servidão florestal or Cotas de Reserva 
Florestal334. The compensation is allowed only if the land is located in the same micro-
watershed, has the same size and same physical characteristics as his land335. 
Both wetlands mitigation and servidão florestal are market instruments employed for 
promoting the restoration of the whole ecosystem in the most economically feasible place. In 
both countries, priority is given to the preservation of the ecosystem where it is located 
because the market instrument is applied only when keeping the ecosystem on-site would 
impair the economic activity (i.e. the development of wetlands is allowed if the developer 
proves to have no reasonable alternative, which means that the destruction of the wetland is 
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avoided solely to the extent that it does not impair the economic activity) or would be 
environmentally disadvantageous and more expensive (i.e. the establishment of servidão 
florestal is only allowed when the developed land has no remaining native vegetation, 
evincing the priority given to the preservation of an existing forest rather than planting a new 
forest where it was previously destroyed). Once it is not possible to keep the ecosystem in its 
original place, wetlands mitigation gives priority to off-site mitigation due to greater 
efficiency in evaluating compliance, while reserva legal gives priority to near-site 
compensation, in order to ensure the existence of protected land in every micro-watershed and 
to prevent the creation of “hot spots” of developed land.  
The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem takes away concerns such as the 
monetization of nature and the utilitarian selection of protected ecosystem services and 
species, which can be found in private payment for ecosystem services. Regulatory payment 
for ecosystem services abolishes the monetization of nature because it promotes a change in 
perspective: while in the private payment for ecosystem services the determination of the price 
of ecosystem services is focused on the monetization of the benefits ecosystems generate to 
humans336; the determination of the price paid in regulatory payment for ecosystem services 
on-site is focused on how much the regeneration of the ecosystem will cost to whoever 
assumes the responsibility for it, because whoever pays for the maintenance of the ecosystem 
(probably the government) is not directly the user of the service. The existence of the 
regulation prior to the development of a market for ecosystem services demonstrates that the 
society in question already values conservation; otherwise, it would not create the regulation 
for conserving the ecosystem.  
In this setting, accounting for ecosystem benefits is not as useful, because citizens do 
not need to be reminded of the importance of conservation by giving monetary values to 
ecosystem services. In such a legal environment, payment to whoever preserves the natural 
resources is not a source of profit: rather, it would be better characterized as a compensation 
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for the costs that person undertook in preserving resources that will contribute to the greater 
good. 
One may argue that if regulatory payment for ecosystem services on-site brings no 
profit to the owner of the natural capital, payment for ecosystem services will not achieve its 
intent; that is, to provide an economic incentive substantial enough to discourage the 
landowner from developing his land. However, it is necessary to remember that the owner of 
natural resources is obliged by regulation to keep the natural capital.  
It is clear that the downside of such a measure, and of any regulation for 
environmental protection, is to discourage conservation beyond the level determined by the 
law. Conservation beyond the level required by the law in each tract of land will be achieved 
in settings that allow the owner of the natural capital to obtain profit: the voluntary payment 
for ecosystem services; and the regulatory payment for ecosystem services for stimulating 
conservation off-site337.  
The commitment of the principle of resilience to long-term efficiency in the 
management of natural resources requires mechanisms that ensure the perpetuity of preserved 
lands. Market mechanisms associated or not with regulations must be designed in a way that 
prevents the easy conversion of currently protected land into developed land when the 
economic incentive ends338. There is lack of certainty regarding the permanence of wetlands 
protected under the wetland banking system, which is one of the main disadvantages of this 
market mechanism. In Brazil, this issue was addressed by characterizing reserva legal as an 
obligation propter rem: a permanent restriction on the usufruct of the land, which must to be 
respected by every future owners339. However, if the compensation of reserva legal is made 
through the use of servidão florestal, there are no guarantees that such vegetation will be 
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protected after the ending of the servitude, because the servitude is not required by law to be 
permanent340.  
The obligation to preserve the whole ecosystem prevents the utilitarian selection of 
protected species and ecosystem services because whoever manages the natural resources will 
be forced by the agencies’ guidelines to preserve all species, not only the ones that have 
economic value. 
 In conclusion, the payment for ecosystem services is compatible with the principle of 
resilience solely as long as it is preceded by a regulation that ensures the preservation of the 
ecosystem in an area where conservation is well-known to be needed to fulfill ecological 
requirements for keeping ecosystem resilience. Voluntary payment for ecosystem services can 
be used to promote protection in areas where the importance of preservation is secondary, or 
where the results of preservation are being tested by adaptive management decisions. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Sustainable development is essentially a means to implement the land ethic. Failure in 
doing so risks reducing the concretization of sustainable development to mere duplication of 
old development, so called the kind of development that gives sole consideration to economic 
growth, not to environmental preservation. 
The acknowledgement of the principle of resilience fills the vacuum existing in the 
operationalization of the principle of sustainable development regarding situations where 
environmental protection cannot be conciliated with economic growth. The principle of 
resilience prevents this vacuum from being filled by the most powerful interest in the conflict 
– the economic – by providing greater legal protection to the weakest interest in the balance – 
the environmental. The principle of resilience consolidates justice in a situation of natural 
inequality by prioritizing the preservation of the environment in decision making. Thereby, 
the principle assists the Law to fulfill its most prominent function of applying justice to 
concrete cases. 
The principle of resilience also obliges decision makers and operators of the law to 
consider the long term effects of their acts on nature and on present and future generations. By 
infusing ecological long-term concerns with patterns of occupation of land, consumption and 
production, the legal principle of resilience guarantees that old unsustainable patterns are not 
replicated during rebuilding after natural disasters and relocating displaced people. The 
ultimate result is the prevention of disasters and the avoidance of repetition of palliative 
measures.  
The principle of resilience provides an ecological foundation to economy which 
stresses the value of replicating components of ecological resilience in economy. The 
principle enhances the enforcement of sustainable yield by acknowledging that economic 
growth must be restrained when deemed necessary to prevent total exhaustion of natural 
resources. Therefore, the application of the principle to economy calls attention not only to 
restrictions on the exploitation of natural resources but also to the need to close the life-cycle 
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of materials through “reuse and recycle”341. In a broader sense, the principle acknowledges 
that humans must live in such a way as not to impair the maintenance of ecological functions 
that ensure the provision of resources and services which both society and the economy 
depend upon to continue existing. As the final result of this effort is the maintenance of 
subsidies for a balanced society and a stable economy, it is possible to affirm that the 
principle of resilience provides greater economic efficiency in the long term and a deeper 
understanding of economy.  
The inclusion of ecological concepts in the functioning of the economy can accelerate 
the adoption of green economy and make it more resilient because the principle of resilience 
provides not only an ecological foundation, but also a moral background to the green 
economy, which is essential to prevent this concept from being sidetracked by traditional 
economic interests during implementation. 
As demonstrated, the use of the principle of resilience will have tangible and practical 
benefits for society. However, this article does not espouse the principle of resilience only for 
its utilitarian benefits, but also for its values and for the benefits it will generate to nature 
itself. Therefore, it is a basic premise of the principle of resilience that its ethical values be 
enforced even when no utilitarian benefits are expected to arise from it.  
The social enforcement of individual and moral obligations generated by the principle 
of resilience requires education for conservation in order to enable people to internalize the 
inherent value of nature and the goal to live in harmony with the land mechanism. Education 
for conservation also provides people with the necessary knowledge to identify how resilience 
is being harmed and what they can do to prevent despised effects on nature. 
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Because the principle of resilience addresses moral obligations vested with legal 
enforcement, it cannot be considered a sectoral principle, applied solely to conducts practiced 
by environment agencies; rather, it is a cross-cutting principle that must be applied at the 
highest level of private and public institutions in order to influence decision making in every 
sector342.  
This article repeatedly demonstrated that the foundations of the principle of resilience 
are already present in International Environmental Law and, consequently, that this is already 
a general principle of International Law. Although the principle already exists buried within 
other principles, we can only enjoy its benefits and apply it to legal procedures when it 
becomes expressly recognized and systematized in the international level. Thus, the principle 
can be incorporated in future treaties and influence the interpretation of existing international 
agreements; it can also be recognized in domestic law, thereby shaping new regulations and 
influencing the interpretation of domestic law by judges and administrators. 
Since the adoption of Agenda 21, States have come to understand and to apply 
sustainable development343. In twenty years, environmental problems became worse. The 
patterns of deterioration show that conservation without resilience is not enough. That is why 
this article concludes that, after the recognition of the principle of resilience in the 
international legal system, the next step for ensuring implementation of the principle in the 
international sphere is to infuse Agenda 21 with the principle of resilience.  
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